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Pressures to generate new business structures, processes, and cultures have 
permeated the business environment of the 1990s. Responding to these pressures, 
managers have begun to embrace new business philosophies designed to create significant 
organizational change, and this trend will continue into the foreseeable future. According 
to Kanter, Todd, and Jick, (1992, p. 3), 
The approach of the year 2000 . . . suggests the possibility of . . . 
profound change in our economic life and the institutions . . . that populate 
it .... The world is undergoing many major transitions, some of which 
involve the meaning of business and the character and shape of the 
organizations that carry it out. 
Because of rapidly changing customer demands and increased global competition, 
in order to survive, private companies have been forced to change their structures and the 
way that they do business (Davenport, 1990). Faced with dwindling financial resources, 
many federal government agencies have also felt the need to change their operating 
procedures. One recent process change initiative within the Department ofDefense has 
involved separate attempts by 29 military commands to redesign their travel management 
processes (Hudson, 1995). 
Whether they impact governmental agencies or large corporations, process-change 
initiatives all have something in common: organizational change. Organizational change, 
however, is more complex and difficult than optimistic researchers and managers think 
(Kanter et al., 1992 ). One study, for example, concludes that between 50 and 70 percent 
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of all business process reengineering efforts fail to achieve their intended objectives 
(Stewart, 1993). 
In addition, recent process change philosophies rely heavily upon the use of 
information technology to alter the way that employees do their jobs, but organizations 
have historically failed to apply this technology effectively (Hammer and Champy, 1993; 
Davenport 1993). Hoping to see substantial gains in organizational productivity, 
managers have been willing to endure the expenses of implementing information 
technologies. Unfortunately, at a macroeconomic level, increases in organizational 
productivity have not offset corporate America's aggregate information technology 
expenditures (Davenport, 1993). Process change requires skillful management if 
organizations are to avoid spending valuable resources on projects that fail to produce the 
desired outcomes. 
This thesis begins with a literature review that describes several methods 
organizations can adopt to attempt to effectively manage process change. In the third 
chapter we use the available planned-change literature, which is reviewed in Chapter II, to 
discuss a case in which an organization attempted to reinvent its travel management 
process. This thesis concludes with a section describing the lessons learned from the case 
presented in Chapter III and that case's implications for future planned change projects. 
To ensure that individuals were willing to participate in interviews relating to this 
thesis, the authors guaranteed interviewees that their actual names would not be used 
within this document. Consequently, the names of individuals presented in Chapter III and 
IV have been changed. Additionally, to help ensure the anonymity of interviewees, we 
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have given the organization that is the subject of this case a fictitious name: The Joint 
Warfare Training Command (JWTC). 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Data Collection 
Because this research attempts to document the actual dynamics of The Joint 
Warfare Training Command's travel reengineering project, it relies primarily upon data 
collected through personal interviews. Unlike research tools used to collect quantitative 
data, personal interviews allow those involved in a particular project to provide detailed 
descriptions of past events and vividly describe their feelings about those events. 
Although the quality of personal interviews is highly dependant upon the skills ofthe 
interviewer, the advantage of personal interviews over surveys is that they allow a wider 
range of responses and provide richer, more detailed research data (Cooper and Emory, 
1995). 
Eighteen individuals agreed to be interviewed about JWTC's travel reengineering 
project. Interviewees were either involved with the initiation of the travel reengineering 
project, the design of the new travel management process, or the implementation and 
support of the new process. Four of these individuals were responsible for starting the 
travel reengineering project; eleven were responsible for designing and/or implementing 
the new JWTC travel management process; five were the intended end-users of the new 
process; and three were travel clerks whose jobs were changed by the new process. 
Interviews were semi-structured and tended to involve three main questions: 
• How have you participated in the travel reengineering project? 
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• How do you view the project's progress to date? 
• How would you like to see the project proceed? 
Although these questions are general, they provided a starting point for the interviewees 
to provide detailed descriptions of their involvement in the project, their fiustrations and 
concerns about the nature of the project, and their reasoning for either supporting or 
resisting the new travel management process. When interviewees were interviewed more 
than once, follow-on questions were more direct and aimed at gaining specific information 
about a particular event. 
In addition to personal interviews, a portion of this document is based upon the 
authors' personal observations. Although some observations were unplanned, most were 
made during three travel reengineering team meetings and three meetings between the 
project coordinator and travel clerks. The authors also attended one training session in 
which the project coordinator demonstrated the new process's software. 
Finally, project participants provided to the authors their team minutes and the 
implementation test plan for the new process. The travel-reengineering team minutes 
covered twelve meetings. The project coordinator also provided us with the minutes from 
three travel clerk meetings that we were unable to attend. This additional information 
augmented the personal interviews and provided information that interviewees could not 
remember. 
2. Analysis 
Analysis of the interview data followed the technique suggested by Rubin and 
Rubin (1995) in Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data. Analysis began with 
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the first completed interview. Each interview was analyzed for responses patterns that 
reflected the subject's reactions to the travel-reengineering project. 
Additionally, based upon the content of completed interviews, the interviewers 
began to search for reoccurring attitudes, beliefs, and expressions in subsequent 
interviews. This process of attempting to recognize common themes was iterative and 
continued throughout the interviewing process. Supplemented by the research presented 
in the reviewed planned-change literature, these themes provided the basis for 
understanding the implications of the JWTC travel reengineering project. 
5 
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IT. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Competitive pressures have forced many organizations to reinvent their processes 
and endure the often painful process of organizational change (Davenport, 1993). This 
chapter provides an overview of several process and organizational change models that 
have been presented in contemporary change literature. Although the following sections 
are not exhaustive, they provide a framework for discussing the case that we present in the 
next chapter. 
A. BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING 
1. The Definition of Business Process Reengineering 
Michael Hammer and James Champy (1993, p. 32) define process reengineering as 
the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign ofbusiness processes to 
achieve dramatic improvements in critical, contemporary measures of 
performance, such as cost, quality, service, and speed. 
A process is the collection of activities that, when taken together, takes one or more 
inputs and produces an output for the customer. Unlike process improvement initiatives, 
which attempt to change a few activities within an organization's existing processes, 
business process reengineering focuses on reinventing entire processes. (Hammer and 
Champy, 1993) 
Consequently, automation is a form of process improvement, not business process 
reengineering. According to Hammer and Champy ( 1993 ), organizations tend to 
mistakenly view the role of technology as a way of enhancing their existing processes. 
These organizations typically want to automate an existing process without fundamentally 
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altering that process. Automating an existing process, however, avoids addressing the real 
problem: an ineffectual, wasteful process. When used with an existing process, 
automation only increases the efficiency of performing flawed or wasteful tasks (Hammer 
and Champy, 1993). 
Although the use of information technology is an important component of business 
process reengineering, using information technology to automate an existing process 
ignores its potential to affect radical process redesign. Instead of using information 
technology as a means of automating existing processes, organizations should view 
information technology as a tool that permits them to reengineer their business processes 
(Hammer and Champy, 1993). They should attempt to determine what new activities 
information technology will allow them to perform. Hammer and Champy (1993, p. 85) 
explain, 
Reengineering, unlike automation, is about innovation. It is about 
exploiting the latest capabilities of technology to achieve entirely new 
goals. One of the hardest parts of reengineering lies in recognizing the 
new, unfamiliar capabilities of technology instead of its familiar ones. 
Business process reengineering is also not the same as organizational restructuring. 
Hammer and Champy (1993) believe that the problems currently facing companies do not 
result from their organizational structures; rather they originate from organizations' 
process structures. As a result, they state that business process reengineering should not 
be viewed as means of restructuring or downsizing an organization. Although business 
process reengineering may result in new organizational structures and a smaller 
workforce, its focus is upon changing processes. 
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2. An Overview of the Reengineering Process 
An organization should begin the reengineering process by first identifying its 
business processes. Although processes correspond to natural business activities, they can 
be difficult to identify because they are often obscured by fragmentation and 
organizational structures. To assist in identifying processes, Hammer and Champy 
suggest using a diagram, which they call a process map, that lays out how work flows 
through an organization. Work flows, which represent processes, can then be described 
in terms that state their beginning and end states. (Hammer and Champy, 1993) 
After processes are identified and mapped, organizations should select candidate 
processes for reengineering. Hammer and Champy list three criteria for selecting a 
process for reengineering. These criteria are: 
• degree of dysfunction: How broken is the process? 
• importance: How much of an impact does a particular process have on 
customers? 
• feasibility: What is the likelihood ofbeing able to successfully reengineer a 
given process? 
After an organization selects a process for reengineering and forms a reengineering 
team for that process, the project team needs to understand the existing process before it 
attempts to redesign the process. Because the team is not attempting to improve the 
existing process, it should not attempt to analyze the existing process in great detail. The 
team should instead attempt to gain a high level view of the existing process. The team's 
understanding of the existing process, however, should be deep enough to provide team 
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members with the intuition and insight necessary to design a new process. (Hammer and 
Champy, 1993) 
The team next begins to redesign their process. Although Hammer and Champy 
admit that there is no standard redesign procedure that will ensure success, they 
nonetheless describe the normative characteristics of the redesign process. During the 
redesign process, team members should suspend their old values and beliefs and apply 
imaginative and inductive thinking in their pursuit of a new and better process. (Hammer 
and Champy, 1993) 
Dealing with resistance is an aspect ofbusiness process reengineering that Hammer 
and Champy ( 1993) say needs to be addressed from the outset of the reengineering effort 
and continued throughout the project. They describe the appropriate method for dealing 
with resistance to change as an ongoing attempt to sell both the need for change and the 
desired end state. Senior managers need to convey two key messages to the rest of the 
organization: "Here is where we are as a company and this is why we can't stay here. The 
second is: 'This is what we as a company need to become."' (Hammer and Champy, 1993, 
p. 149) 
3. The Roles of Different Organizational Members 
Hammer and Champy (1993) list several roles that they have seen emerge as part 
of reengineering efforts. These roles are: 
• the reengineering leader - This is a senior executive who is responsible for 
making the reengineering happen. He or she authorizes or motivates the overall 
reengineering effort. 
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• the process owner - This person should be a senior level manager who is 
responsible for the process targeted for reengineering. This person assembles 
the reengineering team and enables it to do its job. 
• the reengineering team - These individuals are responsible for the actual work 
of reengineering a business process. The team consists of insiders, individuals 
who currently work in the process undergoing reengineering, and outsiders, 
individuals who do not work in the process undergoing reengineering. 
• steering committee - This is a group of senior managers who develop an 
organization's reengineering strategy and monitor its progress. 
• reengineering czar- This is the individual who develop's an organization's 
reengineering tools and techniques. 
After defining the roles ofthe project participants, Hammer and Champy (1993, p. 116) 
conclude, 
In some companies they may have other names or the reengineering roles 
may be defined differently. That's okay. Reengineering is a young art, and 
there is room for more than one approach. 
B. PROCESS INNOVATION 
1. The Definition of Process Innovation 
Thomas Davenport (1993) expands upon Hammer and Champy's process 
reengineering philosophy. Business process reengineering, reinvention, redesign, and 
innovation each implies the same concept: radical process change. Davenport, however, 
prefers the term business process innovation to business process reengineering because, 
according to Davenport (1993, p. 2), "reengineering is only part of what is necessary in 
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the radical change of processes; it refers specifically to the design of the new process." In 
contrast to process reengineering, process innovation focuses on more than the design 
process. Process innovation also includes envisioning new work strategies and 
understanding the interaction of technological, organizational, and human factors during 
the change's implementation. (Davenport, 1993) 
Process innovation, like process reengineering, is different than process 
improvement because innovation involves making radical changes in the way a particular 
process is performed. Process innovation seeks a higher level of change than process 
improvement. While a process improvement initiative involves making a series of 
incremental changes to an existing process, a process innovation project involves 
completely redesigning a given process and then implementing the new process. 
Consequently, process innovation projects take much longer to complete than process 
improvement projects. In addition, unlike process improvement, process innovation 
requires a top-down managerial approach, crosses functional boundaries that separate 
departments, and attempts to change the structure of an organization. Table 1 summarizes 
the differences between process innovation and process improvement (Davenport, 1993, 
p. 11). 
2. The Process Innovation Methodology 
Davenport's process innovation methodology involves five steps. The first step is 
to identify those processes which will undergo process innovation. However, before an 
organization selects candidate processes, it must first identify and define its processes. 
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Improvement Innovation 
Level of Change Incremental Radical 
Staring Point Existing process Clean slate 
Frequency of Change One-time/ continuous One-time 
Time Required for Change Short Long 
Participation Style Bottom-up Top-down 
Typical Scope of Change Narrow, within functions Broad, cross-functional 
LevelofRisk Moderate High 
Primary Enabler Statistical process control Information Technology 
Type of Change Cultural Cultural and structural 
Table 1. Process Improvement versus Process Innovation From Davenport (1993). 
Although Davenport (1993) admits that there is no definitive measure ofwhen an 
organization has defined its processes at the appropriate level of detail, he suggests that 
organizations should attempt to group their work activities into approximately 10 to 20 
major processes. 
After an organization identifies its major processes, it can then select which 
processes it will attempt to change. An organization's capabilities and resources should 
determine the number of processes that it selects for innovation. Assuming that an 
organization has a well-defined business strategy, it should select a process for innovation 
based upon the value of that process to the organization's mission. One method for 
selecting processes is to chose those strategically relevant processes that the 
organization's leadership has identified as being flawed or problematic. (Davenport, 
1993) 
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The second step in Davenport's methodology is to identify mechanisms or tools 
that an organization can incorporate into the design of radically different processes. 
Davenport calls these tools enablers. Identifying enablers involves understanding the 
potential of new information technologies and organizational structures and appreciating 
the limitations of using these enablers within the context of a given organization. 
Although identifying potential process innovation enablers does not involve a thorough 
analysis of each enabler, such as a detailed cost-benefit analysis, research and discussion of 
potential enablers should provide managers with a better idea of what enablers their 
organization could reasonably hope to support in a new process. (Davenport, 1993). 
For example, a company that wants to change the way it fills customers' orders 
should begin by researching the different tools that could be used to support a new order-
fulfillment process. That company might then learn of an exciting, new software tool that 
could be used as one component of the new process. The software would allow its 
customer service representatives to be more responsive in filling customers' orders. 
However, after a closer review of this particular enabler, the company might determine 
that providing workers with the work stations that are needed to run the program would 
require substantial financial resources and extensive employee retraining. In this case, the 
company would have to determine if its fiscal concerns should override the potential 
benefits of using the new order processing program. 
The next step in the five-step innovation methodology is to create a process vision. 
Process visions are the link between an organization's business strategy and its processes. 
Davenport (1993, p. 117) states, 
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Congruence or alignment between strategies and processes is essential to 
radical change in business processes. Strategies and process objectives 
must reinforce one another and echo similar themes. 
Process visions, which should include quantifiable goals and descriptive attributes of the 
new processes' desired end-states, provide the alignment between strategies and processes 
and describe how an organization intends to implement its strategy. According to 
Davenport (1993, p. 118), process visions are important because "strategy cannot 
motivate in the absence of a well-defined process vision." 
The fourth step in Davenport's methodology is attempting to understand the 
process that is the target of redesign efforts. Understanding the existing process allows 
individuals who are involved in an innovation project to identify problems in the current 
process and, consequently, appreciate the potential benefits of redesigning the process. 
Asking applicable functional departments to describe what they view to be the problems 
within the current process is insufficient. Because organizational processes involve more 
than one department and cross functional boundaries, process problems usually go 
unnoticed until the entire process is viewed and scrutinized as a whole. (Davenport, 1993) 
The fifth and final step of process innovation is designing and prototyping the new 
process. Davenport (1993, p. 153) states that completing the design ofthe new process 
"is largely a matter of having a group of intelligent, creative people review the information 
collected in the earlier phases of the initiative and synthesize it into a new process." 
Individuals who participate in the design of the new process should be familiar with the 
future process's high-level vision. They should also consider the opportunities and 
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constraints of potential process enablers. With these considerations in mind, the group of 
process designers can begin to think about new process designs. Davenport (1993) 
recommends that design team members brainstorm different design alternatives. 
Following an analysis that evaluates each design's relative benefit, cost, risk, and 
implementation time frame, the team should select the process that appears to be the best 
of the available alternatives. 
Before an organization can attempt to migrate to the selected process, it must first 
. 
test the design of the new process to ensure that it will operate within the existing 
technological and organizational environment. Therefore, prototyping follows the 
selection ofthe new process design. Davenport defines prototyping as the process of 
using a small-scale, quasi-operational version of a new process to test the process design. 
Prototyping is an iterative learning process that seeks to establish a fit between the new 
process structure, information technology, and the organization. As a result of 
prototyping, senior managers and the design team may discover that the new process 
design requires additional refinement to fit within accepted organizational and 
technological constraints. (Davenport, 1993) 
3. The Roles of Different Organizational Members 
Davenport (1993) states that a successful innovation project requires more than 
the dedication of a single charismatic leader. He lists four major change roles that need to 
be filled as part of a process innovation project. These roles are as follows (Davenport, 
1993, p. 179): 
• the change advocate, the person or group who proposes and desires the change 
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• the change sponsor, the person or group who, through their leadership ability 
and position within the organizational hierarchy, legitimizes the change project 
• the change target, the individuals who must undergo the proposed change 
• the change agent, the individuals or groups who are responsible for 
implementing the change 
According to Davenport ( 1993, p. 179 ), "One of the most common mistakes made 
by companies embarking on process innovation is choosing the wrong sponsor." Process 
innovation requires senior managers to present the rest of the organization with a unified 
endorsement of the need for change and the innovation project's goals. Although it may 
not exist when a change is first proposed, this unified front needs to be developed early in 
a project because it is a prerequisite to the rest of the organization taking a process 
innovation project seriously. Successful process innovation may also require that certain 
job positions and reward structures be modified or eliminated. It is the responsibility of 
the change sponsor to ensure that these requirements are met. Therefore, the change 
sponsor, who may be more than one individual, should come from the most senior ranks 
within an organization. (Davenport, 1993) 
C. THE THREE-STAGE CHANGE MODELS 
1. Organizational Change 
Planned changed literature typically models successful organizational change as a 
three-stage process. Kanter et al. (1992, p. 376) list the different terms used by various 
researchers to explain the three-stage change process: 
• Kurt Lewin called these stages Unfreezing, Changing, and Refreezing. 
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• Richard Beckhard and Reuben Harris called them Present State, Transition 
State, and Future State. 
• Noel Tichy and Maryanne Devanna used the terms Awakening, Mobilizing, and 
Reinforcing to describe the three stages. 
Regardless of the terminology used to describe the various three-stage change models, a 
reoccurring theme emerges from each model (Kanter et al., 1992, p. 375): 
• In stage one the organization realizes that the old way of doing business is 
unacceptable and, therefore, it is time to separate from the past. 
• In stage two the organization embraces a vision of the future and unites behind 
those activities necessary to achieve the desired future state. 
• Finally, the organization institutionalizes new attitudes, practices, and policies 
that serve to solidify the change. 
Kanter et al. describe the different roles that groups of individuals within the 
organization assume as part of the change process. Stage one consists of change 
strategists. These are the individuals who assess the need for change based on the 
organization's external and internal environments. They determine to what degree change 
is needed and attempt to convince others that the change is necessary. Change strategist 
lay the foundation for change projects and formulate the vision of the desired future. 
(Kanter et al., 1992) 
Change implementors are the predominant occupants of stage two. These 
individuals are responsible for instituting the desired changes. They follow the guidance of 
the change strategist, and depending on the degree of control exercised by the change 
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strategist, they may develop an implementation plan for accomplishing the change. 
Change implementers manage the day-to-day change process. Thus, they must respond to 
the demands of the change strategist while attempting to convince others affected by the 
change to cooperate in the change process. (Kanter et al., 1992) 
Change recipients, who are involved extensively with stage three, are the largest 
group in the change process. These are the individuals who will ultimately determine the 
outcome of a change project. Their attitudes about a particular change will affect their 
behavior, and their attitudes will determine whether they continuously resist or 
institutionalize a given change. If change recipients are unwilling to change the way that 
they are currently working, change strategist and implementors will find it difficult to 
create a permanent organizational change. Consequently, one requirement for lasting 
change is the change recipients' belief that change must occur because the old way of 
doing business is unacceptable. (Kanter et al., 1992) 
Although individuals can be associated with a particular group's role and stage 
within the three-stage change models, Kanter et al. (1992, p. 377) state that "any given 
person in an organization is likely to assume each of these roles at some point during the 
different phases of the change process." For example, a manager who starts a business 
process reengineering project to correct what she understands to be an unacceptable 
process may eventually become a change implementer in addition to being a change 
strategist. If a process-innovation team contains individuals from those functional 
departments that will be affected by the team's proposed changes, some change 
implementers will also become change recipients. 
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2. The Relationship Between Organizational Change and Individual · 
Learning 
Because successful change relies heavily upon the reactions of an organization's 
many change recipients, it is important to understand how individuals respond to change. 
Tannenbaum and Hanna (1985, p. 103) believe that all organizational change is mediated 
through individuals: 
The nature of any system change and the degree to which it is realized 
ultimately depend upon the unique responses of the individuals who are 
involved in the change. No system can effectuate change unless that 
change is supported-ideally with enthusiasm-by the individual members of 
the system. 
Therefore, successfully managing organizational change requires appreciating and, when 
possible, managing personal change. 
Tannenbaum and Hanna's research has led them to conclude that individuals react 
to change by following a common pattern. Individuals initially respond to change by 
attempting to hold on to those beliefs, feelings, and behavioral patterns that are threatened 
by the change. The need to hold on is basic to any change process and is natural facet of 
being human. Change recipients may eventually let go oftheir old patterns of thinking and 
acting that keep them from changing. If individuals are successful with this second step, 
letting go, they are then ready to move on to the final stage, realizing the possibilities of a 
new future. (Tannembaum and Hanna, 1985) 
There are several reasons why people attempt to maintain their current reality and 
have difficulty letting go of their old ways of viewing the world. Holding on provides 
individuals with a sense of security and stability. It is a denial of the uncertainty that 
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change creates. A person may also attempt to maintain their existing perception of reality 
because they feel that such attempts will hopefully prevent them from experiencing the 
work and frustration ofbreaking old habits. (Tannenbaum and Hanna, 1985) 
There is, however, a subtler and more powerful reason why people resist letting go 
of familiar habits and beliefs. People often unknowingly resist change because it threatens 
the mental constructs that they use to understand their lives. Although understanding the 
power of a people's mental constructs is essential for effective change management, 
Tannenbaum and Hanna state that change managers and change recipients typically ignore 
this other cause of resistance. They ignore this source of resistance because it is unique to 
each individual, is rooted in a person's unconscious, and involves strong and threatening 
emotions for the person who is attempting to hold on to the past. (Tannenbaum and 
Hanna, 1985) 
Beginning with childhood, an individual's past experiences shape how he or she 
comes to understand their environment. This mental framework, which manifests itself 
through a set ofbeliefs and associated patterns ofbehavior, is a component of a person's 
sense of identity, and it allows a person to interpret confusing situations that may be 
encountered in day-to-day life. More importantly, it is also a mechanism that allows a 
person to explain upsetting life events and painful personal encounters. Consequently, 
letting go of firmly entrenched beliefs and their associated patterns ofbehavior can be 
equivalent to relinquishing a deep-seated, psychological coping mechanism. Individuals 
tenaciously struggle to hold on to their existing patterns of thinking and acting because 
holding on to these patterns maintains their perceptions of reality and their unconscious 
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coping mechanisms. (Tannembaum and Hanna, 1985) 
There are many situational variables that are relevant to any effort to help people 
let go of old patterns of thinking and behaving. Nonetheless, Tannenbaum and Hanna 
suggest a few approaches that organizations can adopt to facilitate individual change. 
They recommend that organizations attempting to facilitate the change process promote 
an open environment in which individuals trust each other and participate in making those 
decisions that involve organizational change. They also claim that forcing individuals 
through the change process is counterproductive. Therefore, effective change requires a 
more patient approach on the part of senior managers. Finally, they recommend that 
organizations use skilled change specialists who can help and support individuals 
throughout the change process. (Tannembaum and Hanna, 1985) 
Recently Bridges (1990) has also outlined the anticipatable dynamics ofthose 
experiencing transition and has discussed the managerial implications of those dynamics. 
Bridges refers to the change process as transition. According to Bridges, change happens 
at a particular point in time when something old stops or something new starts. The 
actual change process involves a three stage psychological transition, and it is this 
transition, not a particular change at a given point in time, that often results in the behavior 
that people interpret as resistance to change. (Bridges, 1990) 
The first stage of transition, which Bridges (1990) calls the end of the world, 
occurs when individuals experience a sense of loss because of some change. The change 
can be a new boss, a new job, or a new organizational structure. Regardless of a 
particular change's scope or value, every change causes somebody in the organization to 
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lose something. People, however, respond differently to loss; a person's response to a 
loss depends on how deeply that loss personally affects him. (Bridges 1990) 
Loss resulting from change tends to fall into at least one of six categories. Change 
can cause a loss of attachments. A loss of attachments results in individuals losing their 
sense of being connected to another individual or group. Change can also result in a loss 
of turf. Bridges (1990, p. 42) defines turf as "everything from people's physical 
territories to fields of responsibility based on their expertise." When change alters or 
eliminates existing patterns of authority, reporting, or physical structure, it creates a loss 
of structure. Change can also take away a facet of an individual's anticipated future. This 
is a loss of future. Individuals may lose their ability to make sense of the world, and they 
may struggle to understand why a particular change has happened. This is a loss of 
meaning. Finally, change can cause a loss of control. With this type ofloss, individuals 
feel as if they have no power to affect the final outcome of events that the change has set 
into motion. (Bridges, 1990) 
People respond to loss by grieving. Grieving is a two-step process that involves a 
mental struggle to hold onto what was lost. The first part of the grieving process results 
in self-protective attempts to convince oneself that the change has not or will not happen 
and occasional expressions of anger and distress. Once individuals move beyond their 
denial and anger, they show the second portion of the grieving process. During this 
period, they begin to vacillate between trying to retain whatever has been threatened by 
change and accepting its loss. (Bridges, 1990) 
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Grieving is a natural response to loss. In addition, a period of grieving is essential 
if change recipients are to successfully continue their transition to a new reality. Thus, 
managers who advocate change should not stifle the grieving process or attempt to rush 
people through it. Although managers may feel uncomfortable in supporting sanctioned 
grieving mechanisms, the destructive potential of a stifled grieving process easily 
outweighs the discomfort of dealing with a grieving individual. When change recipients 
are unable to express their emotions surrounding a loss, their suppressed tensions will 
ultimately hinder the change process. Because grieving is both a natural and necessary 
component of change, Bridges (1990, p. 52) states, 
Transition management ... must begin with finding ways to legitimate the 
grieving process so that losses are worked through to acceptance. The first 
thing that such legitimation requires is an educational effort. Leaders need 
to understand and show through their words and deeds that it is acceptable 
within the organization. 
After a person finishes the grieving process, they enter a period in which they 
recognize that the change has made part of their past irrelevant. However, because the 
change process does not create instantaneous results, a new perceived organizational 
reality has not yet emerged to replace that which was lost. Bridges uses the term neutral 
zone to describe this stage between the old and the new. Because individuals have lost 
their old control structures, the neutral zone creates its own problems. Individuals may 
become confused, depressed, and apathetic. People who were once energetic and content 
workers may suddenly become unmotivated and hostile employees. (Bridges, 1990) 
Although the neutral zone can be painful, an organization's leadership can make 
this second stage less painful and more productive for change recipients. Leaders should 
24 
emphasize the potential for individual growth in the neutral zone. Because change 
recipients are no longer bound to old ways of doing business, the neutral zone provides 
them an opportunity to be more creative and forge their own visions of the future. 
(Bridges, 1990) 
Managers should also fill the void that was created when past organizational 
structures and policies were eliminated. Bridges recommends that organizations develop a 
plan for supporting people throughout the neutral zone. As a result of this plan, change 
managers should be able to establish interim procedures and policies to direct the work 
activities that the change has altered. The plan should also outline temporary lines of 
authority and reporting. These interim mechanisms will provide change recipients with 
some sense of structure until they are able to migrate to the new organizational form. 
(Bridges, 1990) 
Once individuals are convinced that the past is no longer relevant, begin to 
seriously contemplate alternatives, and are willing to consider something new, they are 
ready to begin making a new beginning, which is the last stage of transition (Bridges, 
1990). It is during this stage that change strategist and implementers should attempt to 
institutionalize the desired outcomes of their planned-change process. Although 
advocates of a particular change may be tempted to simply implement and enforce the use 
of a new process, individual transition takes time. Bridges (1990, p. 82) explains why 
change managers should avoid rushing through or skipping the two previous stages: 
An untimely attempt to launch the new beginning can be worse than merely 
ineffective, since it can abort the transition itself Timing explains the 
importance of something that good managers do instinctively: They 
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withhold their own new idea until their people are convinced that the old 
ideas are no longer working. They "sell the problem" before they try to 
"sell the solution." 
D. CONCLUSION 
The literature on reengineering, process innovation, and organizational change 
points to the complexity of successfully implementing planned change. This literature, 
however, is largely normative and, while acknowledging implementation issues, fails to 
fully appreciate the sociotechnical dynamics involved with implementing technical change. 
The remainder of this thesis is an attempt to fill that gap. It is an attempt to acknowledge 
the dynamics of transition and the unintended social consequences of innovative 
reengineering efforts. The next chapter borrows from the insight of the planned-change 
literature to document the actual sociotechnical dynamics that occurred during one 
reengineering effort. Following this, we will explore the social and managerial 
implications discovered during the study ofthe Joint Warfare Training Command's travel 
reengineering project. 
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ill. TRAVEL REINVENTION AT THE JOINT WARFARE TRAINING 
COMMAND 
A. THE JOINT WARFARE TRAINING COMMAND 
The Joint Warfare Training Command (JWTC) is an Atlantic Coast combined-
service command responsible for training U.S. military officers in academic course work 
relevant to joint warfare. Each service provides personnel to help staff the school, but 
overall administrative responsibility for the school is the responsibility of a single service. 
During the time period covered by this document, the Department of the Navy (DoN) 
managed the school's administrative functions, but the school's two commanding officers 
were Army officers. 
Figure 1. is an organizational chart for JWTC. Civilians staff most of JWTC's 
administrative departments, and civilian faculty teach the majority of the school's courses. 
There are 12 academic departments at JWTC, and each department falls under one of 
three academic directors who oversees a broad area of study. These areas of study are 
Joint Warfare Command and Control, Operations Management, and Strategic Studies. 
The following academic departments participated in the travel reengineering project: 
Communication Systems, Information Systems, International Relations, and Logistics 
Management. 
The School's Reinvention Coordinator, who had been responsible for JWTC's 
travel reengineering project, worked directly for JWTC' s Commanding Officer until 
March 1996. The School eliminated the job ofReinvention Coordinator in March but did 
established a full-time Travel Reinvention Coordinator position. The Director of 
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Resource Management then assumed responsibility for directing the activities of the Travel 
Reinvention Coordinator. 
B. PROCESS IM:PROVEMENT VERSUS PROCESS INNOVATION 
In order to understand the attempts to change the travel management process at 
JWTC, it is necessary to first distinguish between process innovation and process 
improvement. Davenport lists several factors that distinguish process innovation from 
process improvement. Attempts at process improvement usually involve continuous, 
incremental changes that begin with an existing process. These type of change projects 
are characterized by a short duration, bottom-up participation, and moderate risk to the 
organization. Process improvements may attempt to bring about a cultural change within 
the organization, but they do not change the structure of the organization (Davenport, 
1993). Ongoing attempts to identify and correct manufacturing processes that result in an 
unacceptable number offaulty components is an example of process improvement. 
Regardless ofthe final outcome ofthe JWTC's travel reengineering effort, the 
project's attempt to change the travel management process represents an attempt at 
process innovation. Process innovation is a level of change that is more radical and risky 
than the incremental changes associated with process improvement. Personnel involved 
with process innovation view the process to be changed from a clean-slate and take their 
direction from the organization's senior management. Although the business objective of 
the process to be changed may remain the same, unlike process improvement, the means 
of accomplishing that objective are not predetermined. Information technology is often 
the tool that is used in the changed process, and those that design the changed process 
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intend for information technology to change both the organization's culture and structure. 
(Davenport, 1993) 
Prior to the development of a travel reengineering team at JWTC, the School's 
Accounting Director purchased a financial version of the Travel Manager Plus software 
package. Travel clerks within the academic departments could use this software to 
generate some common travel management forms. The Accounting Director also hoped 
that the installation of this software would reduce the need for the School's academic 
department travel clerks to hand carry travel paperwork from their offices to the 
Accounting Office. According to Lieutenants Glenn Terry and Richard Turner, who were 
two students involved with the travel reengineering project, the Accounting Director 
wanted to use the financial version of the Travel Manager software to automate as much 
of the existing travel management process as possible. He wanted to improve the current 
process rather than innovate. 
In contrast to the Accounting Director's plan for process improvement, the travel 
reengineering team proposed a more ambitious plan for changing the School's travel 
management system. They were involved in process innovation. Their design involved 
using a newer version of Travel Manager Plus, and they intended to use the software in a 
totally redesigned travel management process. This redesigned travel management 
process called for changes in both people's beliefs and the organization's structure. We 
will describe the details of the proposed changes in later sections. 
Tannenbaum and Hanna would call process innovation basic change. When 
compared to superficial change, which involves giving up attributes that are relatively less 
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important to a system's identity, basic changes are difficult or impossible to make 
(Tannenbaum and Hanna, 1985, p. 102). Basic changes are difficult because they involve 
people giving up attributes of their identity and facing uncertainty. In addition, as an 
attribute becomes more central to a person or group's identity, it becomes more painful 
for individual's to relinquish the identifying attribute. 
Tannenbaum and Hanna's change model provides another framework from which 
to view JWTC's travel reinvention project. The model predicts that the School's attempt 
at process innovation will not similarly affect all of the involved individuals. Although the 
overarching goal of process innovation might be basic change, the change's impact on 
some groups will be superficial because it does not fundamentally alter those group's 
sense of identity. The same change, however, will represent basic change for other 
groups. Tannenbaum and Hanna's model predicts that those in this second grouping will 
be more resistant to the change process relative to those who are only superficially 
impacted by the new travel management system. 
C. THE CATALYSTS FOR PROCESS INNOVATION 
The need to improve financial performance is the most common reason that 
private-sector organizations try process innovation (Davenport, 1993). Customer service, 
productivity, and coordination between functional departments can impact an 
organization's financial performance; therefore, companies typically target these areas for 
process innovation. Nonfinancial objectives, however, are typically more effective at 
inspiring efforts to innovate processes (Davenport, 1993). 
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A desire to eliminate waste, increase productivity, and improve customer service 
within the travel management process resulted in the formation of a travel reengineering 
team. As will be discussed later, these were the primary objectives of the travel 
reengineering team, but they do not fully explain why the School chose to attempt its first 
process innovation. The travel reengineering project represents the School's first attempt 
to reengineer one of its own processes, and one nonfinancial objective was at least 
partially responsible for this first attempt. 
Prior to the School's efforts to change its travel management system, the Navy 
designated JWTC as the Navy's first Reinvention Laboratory. This designation resulted in 
a change of what others from outside the School expected from JWTC and what the 
School expected from itself Kanter et al. (1992) explain that organizations behave in 
ways that conform to institutional beliefs about how they ought to be structured. JWTC's 
Reinvention Laboratory designation brought with it a new set of institutional beliefs. 
Therefore, the School had to conform to new expectations and beliefs in addition to its 
familiar views of itself as a center of higher learning; it had to behave like a School and a 
reinvention laboratory. 
Senge (1990) helps clarify how a title can impact behavior. The Reinvention 
Laboratory title became a part of the language used to describe the School, and by 
changing peoples' perceptions of the School, this language affected the School's behavior. 
Because language determines what we are prepared to see (Senge, 1990), the words 
reinvention laboratory changed the Schools perception of itself The School had never 
successfully redesigned a local business processes, and this fact acted in conjunction with 
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the new title to create a perception of institutional inadequacy. 
These feelings of inadequacy resulted in a sense ofurgency and importance 
surrounding the travel reengineering project. One ofthe project's initial members 
described how the School's reinvention leadership viewed the travel management 
reengineering effort: 
They've had no success at reinvention, internal successes where they could 
reinvent anything at the School. They have been successful at doing some 
stuff for other commands like doing research projects and helping some 
other commands reinvent something. As far as internally, they haven't 
enjoyed any real success stories. So they're looking for one. 
Another team member explained, 
One of the reasons that I think Travel Manager is so important, apart from 
its own intrinsic importance, is that it really is sort of our pilot attempt to 
reinvent the place. So I really see it as pretty crucial to get a demonstrated 
success. 
D. THE SELECTION OF TRAVEL MANAGEMENT FOR PROCESS 
INNOVATION 
Identifying processes for innovation is the first step ofDavenport's five-step 
process innovation model. Davenport describes this step as the process of identifying an 
organization's major processes and then selecting certain processes for innovation. The 
selection of a particular process should be based on the organization's resources, the 
strategic relevance of the target process, the organization's dissatisfaction with that 
process, the scope and boundaries of the process, and the cultural and political climate 
surrounding the process. Assessment of the cultural and political climate surrounding a 
process is important because it enables those who select the target processes to avoid 
change efforts that would probably have insufficient support from the organization. 
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(Davenport, 1993) 
Prior to any attempts by JWTC to redesign the travel management process, it was 
recognized by the federal government that its current travel management system was 
plagued by inefficiencies. For example, as part of the 1993 National Performance Review 
(NPR), which was led by Vice President AI Gore, the Defense Performance Review 
(DPR) identified the travel management system as a potential target for reinvention. 
According to the Director of the Defense Performance Review, General Mcinerney, the 
DoD spent $2.3 billion overseeing and administering travel but only spent $2 billion on 
actual travel expenses (Cohen, 1994). Several organizations throughout the federal 
government, including the Air Force and the National Security Agency, responded to this 
assessment by launching their own travel reinvention programs. 
Dr. Whitaker, who is now the School's Director oflnnovation, was the first 
person from JWTC to visit a DoD site that was attempting to reinvent travel. During a 
trip to Washington D.C., Air Force District ofWashington (AFDW) personnel described 
to Dr. Whitaker their efforts to redesign the travel management process. Whitaker, who 
was impressed by the AFDW' s use of Travel Manager Plus in a reengineered travel 
management process, returned to JWTC and relayed his experiences at AFDW to Dr. 
James Elliot, who at this time was teaching resource management modeling courses within 
the Department ofLogistics Management. 
Dr. Robert Hendrick, who visited AFDW with Whitaker, was also a member of the 
JWTC reinvention laboratory. After learning ofthe Air Force's success with travel 
reinvention, Hendrick viewed travel reinvention as an exciting possibility for improvement 
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at the School. Hendrick said that he was anxious to try something similar to the AFDW 
project because it would make JWTC's travel management system "better, cheaper, and 
faster." 
As a result of a later visit to AFDW, enthusiasm for travel reinvention at JWTC 
continued to grow and gather momentum. Prior to July of 1994, Dr. Whitaker returned to 
Washington with Dr. Elliot. The Two visited AFDW, where Air Force personnel 
described their reengineered travel management process to Elliot. Before this visit to 
AFDW, neither Whitaker nor Elliot knew that travel reengineering would become the 
School's first attempt at process innovation. They were interested in reinventing 
processes at JWTC, but this visit to AFDW resulted in a renewed interest in reengineering 
travel management and set off a series of events that eventually laid the ground work for 
redesigning the School's travel management system. As Elliot said, 
We were talking to him (Captain Roy Barger, from Air Force AFDW) just 
as part of our general interest in reinvention, which is something that Dr. 
Whitaker is very involved in. That triggered our interests because it looked 
like it was a potentially big win. 
After he returned from his Washington trip, Elliot began advertising travel 
reengineering as a potential research-paper topic to his students. Two students in Elliot's 
modeling class, Lieutenants Terry and Turner, agreed to perform an analysis ofthe Navy's 
travel management process for a class project. After discussing the topic in class, Terry 
and Turner traveled to Washington D.C. in August 1994 and examined AFDW's 
F AS Travel, the Air Force's name for their reinvented travel management system. As part 
of their class paper, Turner and Terry also studied the costs associated with handling a 
35 
travel instance. 
Turner and Terry's research was important for two reasons. Their knowledge of 
the travel management process and experiences with the Air Force's FASTravel system 
would later become indispensable to the School's newly named Reinvention Coordinator. 
In addition, their class paper made indisputable many of the inefficiencies with both the 
JWTC and DoD travel management systems. Elliot described the scope and impact of 
Turner and Terry's paper: 
[It] turned out to be very influential. It was, I think, one of the few, if not 
the only, attempt to document the actual costs of handling a travel instance: 
getting travel arranged, eventually submitting a voucher, getting paid, and 
that sort of thing. They wrote a first class paper, and that was circulated 
quite a bit in Washington as I understand it. I think that even the White 
House got it. GAO got it. 
The experiences ofWhitaker and Elliot in Washington and the research of Turner 
and Terry were important in the ultimate decision to select the travel management process 
for redesign, but both the instructors and some senior personnel at the School did not need 
additional evidence to reinforce their dislike of the School's current travel management 
system. Whitaker exclaimed that he could not go across the campus without an instructor 
coming up to him to complain about the School's travel management process. 
The dissatisfaction of the faculty was apparent enough for the School's 
Commanding Officer, Major General Mitchell, to take notice. Major Ralph Friedman, 
who became the School's Reinvention Coordinator in November, 1995, said that travel 
management and passport management had become two ofthe General's "pet peeve's." 
Colonel Stan Kendall, the School's Director of Resource Management, accredited the 
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General's dislike for the existing travel management system to the frequent complaints 
voiced by instructors: 
When I got here in October-November of'94, General Mitchell was 
particularly unhappy with the way travel was being administered in general 
in direct response to all the histrionics that primarily all the faculty folks 
raise about travel, and basically he said, "Do something." So, at the time, 
travel manager was basically a gleam in our eyes. Ralph Friedman, Major 
Friedman, was primarily doing reinvention kinds ofthings. This fell under 
that umbrella very loosely. Frankly, myself and the Accounting Director 
grabbed Major Friedman and said, "Let's get on with this." 
Friedman's decision to attempt to change the travel process, however, was not 
based on Colonel Kendall's direction to "get on with this." Kendall's office would by 
necessity become an important part of the redesign process, but, as Friedman frequently 
stated during his interview, he worked for the Commanding Officer, not Kendall. Because 
Friedman worked for the Commanding Officer, he could have chosen either travel 
management or passport management to be his first project. 
The issue of which process would become the target for the School's first attempt 
at process innovation was eventually settled sometime during the 1995 January- February 
time frame. Up to that point there had been no unified or systematic attempt to reengineer 
the travel management process. The Accounting Director did purchase the financial 
version of Travel Manger Plus in the fall of 1994, but as discussed previously, the 
Accounting Director intended for the software to be used in automating the existing 
process. Dr. Elliot was aware of the growing interest in improving the travel management 
process. Therefore, he decided to gather those individuals who were interested in 
changing travel management for a meeting in which Terry and Turner presented a brief on 
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travel reengineering efforts at the national level. Those present at the meeting included: 
Elliot, Friedman, Kendall, Dan Najarian, who heads the School's Computer Center, and 
Lucy Wade from the School's Total Quality Leadership (TQL) Office. 
This meeting represents a definitive point in the process innovation model 
described by Davenport. Shortly after the meeting, Friedman decided to put together a 
team to reengineer the travel management process. Major Friedman had chosen travel 
management as the School's first process innovation effort. 
No one single factor resulted in the selection of travel management for reinvention. 
Instead, a number of interrelated forces and activities culminated in the selection of travel 
management for process innovation. The factors and events that culminated in a final 
selection include: 
• a compelling desire to reengineer a local process - any process 
• Whitaker and Elliot's visit to AFDW, which sparked their enthusiasm 
• Terry and Turner's research, which was initiated because of Whitaker and 
Elliot's AFDW visit 
• the meeting in which Turner and Terry briefed their research 
• the faculties perceived dislike of the existing travel management process 
• and, the availability of a viable commercial software product, Travel 
Manager 
If any of these items been absent, it is doubtful that the effort to reinvent travel 
management at JWTC would be as far a long as it is today. 
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E. UNDERSTANDING INNOVATION ENABLERS 
An organization should have a high-level understanding ofthe different 
mechanisms that can be used in a new, innovative process before it attempts to redesign an 
existing process (Davenport, 1993). These mechanisms, which Davenport calls enablers, 
can become building blocks for new processes. They include different organizational 
structures, human resources, and information technologies. 
Contrary to Davenport's normative model, those involved in the travel 
reengineering project did not go through a formal step of identifying innovation enablers. 
The early work ofWhitaker, Elliot, Terry, and Turner, however, did identify one possible 
approach to redesigning the travel management process. Specifically, through their visits 
with AFDW personnel, each of these individuals saw first hand how the Air Force had 
applied a particular software package to a redesigned and improved travel management 
process. As Davenport (1993) explains, examining how other organizations have applied 
various enablers allows an organization to better design a new process. 
Although the project founders were potentially aware of many enablers through 
class work, job experience, and visits with AFDW, Davenport's model includes within the 
enabler identification stage other steps in addition to identification. Once potential 
technological and organizational opportunities for process change have been identified, an 
organization needs to determine what constraints exist that would limit the application of a 
particular enabler within a new process. Organizations also need to determine which 
constraints should be eliminated to allow the application of a particular enabler. 
Individuals involved in a particular process innovation can then use the remaining enablers 
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to help shape the process vision (Davenport, 1993). 
Although Davenport admits that the conventional process reinvention wisdom 
espouses examining enablers after the process is designed, his model does help explain 
many of the problems that the project team encountered during its attempt to design and 
implement a new travel management process. For example, because the School's 
leadership never stated that job security was an organizational constraint, Friedman was 
working under the assumption that the team could legitimately propose eliminating jobs. 
As will be shown in later sections, the failure ofthe project team to appreciate existing 
constraints and the failure of senior leadership to define boundaries for the project helped 
to create much of the fiustration felt by the project's participants. 
F. DEVELOPING A PROCESS VISION 
Creating a process vision is another prerequisite to process redesign. Because 
processes should be picked for change based partly on their strategic relevance, Davenport 
(1993) states that the process vision is an important link between an organization's 
business strategy and action designed to implement that strategy. Davenport's concept of 
process vision includes two components: process objectives and process attributes. 
Process objectives are quantified targets for the process innovation project, and process 
attributes are qualitative descriptions ofthe envisioned future state. Davenport (1993) 
explains that, for a process to be successfully transformed, guidance for the process 
innovation needs to be made explicit and operational through a vision that describes the 
desired process's functionality, change objectives, and qualitative future state. 
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Here again, the JWTC travel reengineering project deviates from Davenport's 
normative model. Neither Friedman, Kendall, or the School's Executive Steering 
Committee (ESC) explicitly stated a consistent process vision. Nonetheless, different 
personnel involved with the project developed their own visions ofwhat the future state 
should look like. Whitaker wanted the project to result in a streamlined process that 
would save money and legitimize the School's position as a leader in process reinvention: 
We want to make it easier on the travelers, Okay, but we also need to save 
some damn money, and [eliminate] some people, some slots, and be able 
to demonstrate to the rest of the world that we are ready to kick some butt 
around here. 
Throughout the project, Friedman stressed the need for the new process to remove 
inefficiencies that existed in the old process and save money. Friedman wanted to create a 
process that would eliminate unnecessary paperwork and job positions. Although 
Friedman felt that the new travel management system would also benefit the traveler, as 
will be discussed later, he was more interested in creating what he considered to be a less 
wasteful process. 
The ESC did not specify a desired end state for the project, nor did they mandate 
that the travel reengineering team work towards a specific goal. Friedman, however, felt 
that they wanted a new process that would be less expensive to maintain. Friedman 
described the reaction of the ESC following the completion of the new process design: 
At that time they [the ESC] said go forth because we estimated that we 
could save like a third of a million dollars a year in administrative costs 
[this figure was determined locally] by transferring to an electronic system 
if it were adopted School wide. 
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Terry agreed that the new process should remove unnecessary steps, but his 
process vision also focused on using technology to improve conditions for the customer. 
In Terry's image of the future state, travel process customers would use IT imbedded in 
an improved, radically different process. According to Terry, 
The thing that interests you is that you can see a system that would be so 
dramatically better, not just save a little bit of time or maybe a little easier 
on you, but dramatically better in a sense that you kind of envision a system 
where a traveler can sit there at a computer terminal and pull up and say, "I 
need to go to Washington this week and these are the airline times and 
routes that will get me there and that are within the government contract 
rates." You can see all that kind of stuff, you can punch it all into the 
computer, it could get spit out and get tickets back in a very timely fashion . 
. . . It's kind of exciting to be at least talking about being able to change 
something with dramatic results. 
Terry considered technology instrumental in providing end-users with the level of 
customer satisfaction that he envisioned in the new process. 
Because Colonel Kendall's responsibilities included overseeing Jensen's 
Accounting Department, which is responsible for the execution of the School's budget, 
Kendall's vision of the future is also important. Kendall, however, was not interested in 
process innovation. He was interested in automation, and therefore, his vision ofthe 
future did not include any changes to the School's financial authority structure. 
According to Kendall, 
The thrust was initially an end-to-end kind of situation [the process 
proposed by Terry and Turner]. I said basically, "The hell with the end-to-
end thing. Let's attack the orders, the order production side of it, first, and 
then we'll let the other side of it flow." 
Kendall wanted a system that would initially keep the current process intact, but he also 
wanted to improve efficiency through the use of information technology to automate the 
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production and handling of travel requests. Kendall initially wanted process improvement, 
not process innovation. 
G. GAINING AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXISTING PROCESS 
1. The Necessity of Understanding the Current Process 
Although Davenport admits that some process innovation methodologies do not 
include this step, he stresses that it is necessary for process innovation efforts to include an 
attempt to understand the existing process before designing a new one. An understanding 
of the existing process is important for several reasons. First, an understanding of the 
current state helps those involved in the innovation activities to develop a common 
framework from which to view the existing process state. Understanding the current state 
thoroughly is crucial to ensuring a successful migration to the new process., Also, if the 
process design team members do not understand the existing process, they may duplicate 
problems with the current process in the redesigned process. Finally, according to 
Davenport, an understanding of the existing process allows those involved with the 
innovation to see the value of the proposed innovation. (Davenport, 1993) 
2. The Decision to Form a Travel Team 
Although Friedman could rely on Terry and Turner to explain the fundamentals of 
the existing travel management process, he needed to have a cross-functional team at his 
disposal that could explain the details of the old process. Friedman also needed assistance 
in designing a new process. Recognizing this, he decided to put together a travel 
reengineering team, which would have as its first responsibility the task of understanding 
the existing process. 
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Terry recalled that Friedman intended to use the team throughout the innovation 
effort. Friedman expected team members to assist in understanding the current system, 
developing an innovative replacement process, and implementing the new process. To 
accomplish these goals, he selected team members from various departments throughout 
the School based on their functional knowledge of the existing process. Team members 
included a travel clerk, a representative from the TQL office, two representatives from the 
Accounting Department, Terry, Turner, Elliot, LT Jean Ferguson, who was the Personnel 
Support Detachment's (PSD) Officer in Charge (OIC), Master ChiefBob Hutton, who 
was a PSD disbursing clerk, and occasionally a representative from SATO, the School's 
Commercial Travel Office (CTO). 
3. Problems Encountered While Forming the Team 
While attempting to put together the travel reengineering team, Friedman began to 
encounter initial signs of resistance and evidence that not everybody involved with the 
innovation project was throughly committed to change. For example, shortly after 
Friedman decided to put together a team, the Accounting Director's office replaced a 
representative desired by Friedman with another representative. Anne Flood explained 
that she became the replacement from the Accounting Department because the 
representative that Friedman wanted was allegedly "too busy to attend the team 
meetings." 
Even when the individuals selected by Friedman attended the team's inaugural 
meeting in March, some did so less than willingly. In marked contrast to the enthusiasm 
expressed by the project's founders, they reluctantly agreed to participate. Friedman 
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commented, 
There were a few people who willingly volunteered, like Richard [Turner] 
and Glenn [Terry]. I mean they jumped all over it. Dr. Elliot was good 
about volunteering his time too. But some of the folks were "Just another 
god damned TQL team, and nothing is going to happen out of it. Nothing 
is going to work. I'm wasting my time." 
Kanter et al. suggest a possible reasons for some members' lack of enthusiasm. 
Using a three-step change model based on Lewin's work, they explain that those who 
initiate a change project are typically involved in the unfreezing stage ofthe change model, 
which is the stage when people separate from the past and recognize that the old way of 
doing business is unacceptable . People involved in the unfreezing stage are the process 
innovation instigators and visionaries. (Kanter, et al., 1992) 
Elliot, Terry, Turner, and Friedman brought the innovation project into existence 
because they were enthused with the prospect of changing what they viewed to be an 
unacceptable process. Other team members, however, had no role in the project's 
initiation and had not yet separated themselves from the old process. Subsequently, they 
did not view travel management reengineering with the same enthusiasm as the project's 
founders. 
According to Michael Beer (1988), dissatisfaction with a particular process creates 
the motivation for people to change. Elliot, Terry, and Turner had studied the School's 
travel management process and saw how it performed relative to the AFDW travel 
management process. Their work prior to joining the travel reengineering team convinced 
them that the existing process was unsatisfactory. When they were asked by Friedman to 
join the project, the other team members had not yet studied the entire travel management 
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process nor had they had the opportunity to see the AFDW process. Therefore, the other 
team members were less likely to be dissatisfied with existing process and, as a result, less 
likely to be motivated to join the team. 
4. The Team Meetings Begin 
The team began meeting for two hours a week on 07 March 95. Terry described 
what happened during the team's first meeting: 
When we first met, the first thing that everyone said was "flow-chart the 
old process." We said, "No, let's not flow chart the old process; we 
[Turner and Terry] have already been down that road." We took our 
work, where we documented the time and cost associated with the old 
process, and a JWTC travel management system flowchart previously done 
by two other students and walked everybody through the process. 
Because they relied on Terry and Turner's previous work, on 21 March the team felt that 
they knew the existing travel management system well enough to begin thinking about 
ways to design a new process. They had dedicated approximately four to six hours to 
understanding the old travel management process. 
Although there is no definitive measure that indicates when an old process is 
sufficiently understood to allow designing a new one, the analysis of the old process 
should be broad enough to describe the systemic nature of the existing process 
(Davenport, 1993). This was particularly true for the travel project because travel 
management interacted with a number of other processes at the School. In addition, the 
School's travel management policy had to meet certain DoD, and federal regulations. 
Friedman, however, later admitted that the team did not gain a sufficient understanding of 
the old process: 
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You think that you have the process fully flowed out. I'm still learning that 
we don't know our process a hundred percent .... Somebody else is 
popping something up in front ofyou: "Well, yeah, you flowed it out, but 
that's not really the way that we do business." So it's almost to the point 
that by us not knowing our processes, that we can't define our processes 
.... That has been a major barrier, that we don't know what the hell our 
processes are around here . . . . We have no waivers [requests to deviate 
from mandated procedures or guidelines] in the system. It's because 
people have to know what they want to waive in order to waive something. 
We don't know our instructions, so we don't know what the hell we want 
waived. 
Sometime during the first three meetings, the team attempted to assign people to 
certain positions. Friedman designated the TQL Office representative as the team's 
facilitator, but according to Terry, "He [the TQL representative] never did much 
facilitating." In addition, the team decided that LT Ferguson, the PSD OIC, would act as 
team leader. Terry and Flood, however, said that Friedman actually ran the team 
meetings. The team also approved its charter during the 14 March meeting. This charter 
explained that the team's goals were to automate the process when possible, remove 
unnecessary control points, and improve customer satisfaction. 
B. DESIGNING THE NEW PROCESS 
1. Creativity and Idea Generation 
Designing the new system is one component ofDavenport's fifth process 
innovation step. Davenport ( 1993) describes brainstorming as an effective part of the 
design stage, and he adds that brainstorming sessions should be characterized by a non-
judgmental atmosphere that supports creativity and idea generation. T earn members and 
the team's minutes indicate that Friedman actively solicited each team member's ideas and 
opinions during the design stage. 
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This atmosphere of creativity, however, did not apply to the selection of the Travel 
Manager Plus software, which would eventually be used in the new process. Although 
Friedman expected the team members to participate in laying out the new process, he did 
not involve them in the selection of the software that would be instrumental in providing 
the new process some of its functionality. Not only did Friedman not include all of the 
travel team in the software selection process, the project's founders who were 
participating on the team made this decision sometime before the design stage began. 
During a discussion concerning the software selection, Flood said, 
When I got into the travel management team [ 14 March], it had already 
been in place. I'm not too sure for how long, so I kind of came in after it 
had already started. That [the decision to use Travel Manager Plus] was 
already in place. 
Following the project's design stage, Terry admitted, "I don't think that there was a doubt 
in our mind, even before the project started, that we would use some version of Travel 
Manager." 
The project's founders chose the Travel Manager software package because, 
according to Terry, it appeared to work for the Air Force and was available through the 
GAO catalogue. Davenport (1993) states that organizations need to identify IT enablers 
early in a project, but he also warns that software packages that are chosen before the new 
process design is complete may not even support the new process design. The fact that 
AFDW, which has a mission, organizational structure, and set of constraints different from 
those at JWTC, was able to use a tailored version of Travel Manager does not necessarily 
mean that the JWTC would be equally successful. Elliot may have been correct when he 
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said that Travel Manger Plus appears to be the "best of the breed," but it is also possible 
that the travel team could have collectively chosen a better software package after the 
completion of the new process design .. 
2. Signs of Resistance during the Flowcharting of the Ideal Travel 
Management Process 
Friedman and Terry agreed that the travel reengineering team began the design 
process by first flowcharting what they perceived to be the ideal travel management 
process. From an organizational change perspective, as Friedman began to flowchart the 
new process and worked to lead the team through the design process, he was attempting 
to initiate the changing stage ofLewin's three-step change model. Kanter et al. (1992) 
state that the changing stage occurs when the organization, or in this case, the team, 
begins to unite and move towards a new future. 
Although planned-change theory suggests that a concerted effort to create 
something new should typify the design stage, the opposite happened at JWTC. 
Foil owing the 14 March meeting, which marked the end of the team's design efforts, the 
team meetings began to be characterized by a state of passive resistance. For example, 
during the 21 March meeting, Friedman asked Master ChiefBob Hutton, a Disbursing 
Clerk from PSD, and Flood to attend the next meeting with some additional details 
concerning PSD and Accounting Department travel management controls. PSD's inputs 
in the design process were valuable because that office was responsible for ensuring that 
post-trip voucher payments were correct. The Accounting Department was responsible 
for ensuring that academic departments operated within their travel budgets and the 
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appropriate funds were obligated and expended for travel. At the next meeting, however, 
Flood and Hutton had not acted on Friedman's request, and Friedman had to again ask for 
their cooperation in obtaining the information. 
This was not an isolated incident; Terry claimed that it was fairly common to have 
to repeatedly ask team members for assistance and information. The minutes for 20 April, 
which was the date on which the team finished flowcharting the proposed ideal process, 
stated that attendance was low. Terry added that this also was not an isolated incident 
and that it had become common for certain team members to miss meetings. 
Although Hutton said that he had no qualms with participating on the team, Flood 
openly admitted that she had reservations about her involvement with the project. During 
one design meeting Flood told Friedman that her position within the Accounting 
Department and her assignment to the team created conflicting demands. Terry recalled 
the incident: "She told him, 'I understand where you are coming from, but I'm also taking 
direction from above [from the Accounting Department]."' 
In Bridges (1990) three-step change model, individual transition does not begin 
until something old is stopped or, as Kanter et al. (1992) explain it, there is a separation 
from the past. The process design phase defined how extensively the new process would 
change the past travel management process. This fact explains why some team members' 
resistance increased as the team went through the process of designing the ideal process. 
As the team came closer to the completion of the ideal process design, team members who 
were involved in the operation of the old travel management process gained a greater 
understanding of how their work with the team could possibly affect them and their offices 
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and departments. The emerging details ofthe new process specified what was likely 
ending and created the resistance that Bridges associates with transition. 
3. The Ideal Process 
If fully implemented, the new process finally designed by the team would create 
substantial changes in the way JWTC manages travel. Appendix A, which is based upon 
the work ofT erry and Turner, outlines the team's completed proposed process. The 
following section describes the flowchart in Figure 2. and provides a more general 
description ofthe proposed travel management process: 
• Once fully implemented, the new process would begin when a traveler requests 
a trip by entering her trip information into the Travel Manager Plus software 
package. 
• A Commercial Travel Office (CTO) electronically receives the trip information 
and generates a cost estimate for the trip. The CTO then electronically sends 
the trip's airline, lodging, and rental car cost estimates to the traveler's 
departmental director. 
• After reviewing the trip's total cost estimate, which the software computes, and 
checking the accounting database to ensure that sufficient funds are available, 
the department chairman can choose to either approve or disapprove the 
requested travel. 
• If the travel request is approved, the software updates the accounting database, 
and the CTO receives the approved request. 
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Figure 2. Simplified Version ofthe Proposed Travel Management Process 
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• The CTO then confirms the traveler's reservations, purchases the tickets using 
the traveler's government charge card, and electronically notifies the traveler 
that their request has been approved. 
• After the trip, the traveler enters the actual expenses of the trip into Travel 
Manager Plus. If the actual travel expenses are within specified limits, the 
software updates the accounting database and sends the trip record (the travel 
voucher) to a contractor for payment. 
• Once the trip record is sent for payment, the software has the accounting 
database designate the applicable funds as expended. With the proposed 
process, GELCO government services, a private company, would use 
Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) to credit the traveler's bank account. The 
traveler would also have the option of having GELCO send a portion ofthe 
post-trip payment directly to the charge card company. 
If this process were fully implemented, it would require an interface with the 
Accounting Director's accounting database and would place the responsibility for 
managing travel funds at the departmental level. It would also eliminate the need for a 
Personnel Support Detachment to be involved in voucher payments and receipt storage, 
and it would make the retention of departmental travel clerks questionable. 
While these changes are significant, Terry felt that the team could have proposed 
more. Although the School is currently contractually bound to use the services of SATO, 
the School's Commercial Travel Office, Terry suggested that perhaps it was not necessary 
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to involve a CTO in the travel management process. He felt that it would have been 
possible to design a system that allowed travelers to make their own plane, hotel, and 
rental car reservations without using SATO. 
I. REFINING THE FLOWCHARTED PROCESS AND MOVING TOWARDS 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Davenport (1993) lists prototyping as the second part ofhis fifth step, and he 
describes it as an iterative process that attempts to accomplish a fit between a new process 
structure, information technology, and the organization. The travel management team did 
not complete a period of prototyping before attempting to implement the new process in 
the test departments. Instead, the team intended to use the test departments as platforms 
for prototyping before carrying the implementation further. Nonetheless, the team did 
attempt to address the relationship between its ideal process, the organization (which 
included JWTC and the DoD), and technology before implementing the new process in the 
test departments. 
Friedman wanted to have the team assist him in implementing the process that they 
had just flowcharted. He knew, however, that there were still a number of issues that 
needed to be resolved before the team could finalize its travel management process design. 
The issues that still required the team's attention included: 
• obtaining support from the Director ofResource Management, the 
Accounting Department Director, and the School's ESC, 
• modifying their ideal process to meet the requirements and regulations 
imposed by the Navy and DoD, 
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• and, determining how to fit the Travel Management Plus software into their 
new process. 
1. Seeking Support from the Organization 
Support for the Accounting Director's office was necessary for two reasons. First, 
the team needed the Accounting Department to assist in purchasing the new software. 
Second, the Accounting Department personnel had a stake in how the project proceeded 
because they were responsible for overseeing the current travel management process. 
Consequently, on 4 May members from the travel team briefed the Accounting Director, 
Bill Jensen, and Jensen's boss, Colonel Kendall, on the proposed process. 
Terry recalled that the team wanted to "present the idea that his office [the 
Accounting Director's] would not have to sign off on [approve] every travel order." The 
School's Accounting Director, however, felt that his office would always need to approve 
travel. Terry says that it was during this briefing that Bill Jensen remarked, "That will 
never happen while I'm here." (It is unclear whether Jensen intended his remarks to be a 
threat or a prediction.) 
Jensen was not opposed to using an IT system as part of the new process. Prior to 
the team's briefing, his department had already purchased the Financial version ofTravel 
Manager. Terry says that the difference between the two groups was primarily over how 
the software would be used: 
There wasn't much difference between the older, Financial version of 
Travel Manager and Travel Manager Plus [which is what eventually gets 
installed in the test departments]. The real difference is in how we intended 
to use Travel Manager Plus; we were going to use it with a reengineered 
process. 
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During the 1980s, the School used a travel management process similar to the 
team's proposed process . That process also had travel approval authority at the academic 
departmental level. According to Jensen, the School initiated the current travel 
management system because of a 1986 Inspector General report that listed a number of 
problems with the School's travel management system. Jensen stated that these problems 
included fraudulent thesis travel and uncompleted travel vouchers. Jensen felt that his 
office gave order and control to a process that would otherwise be abused. 
A difference in process vision also accounts for Jensen's reluctance to endorse the 
project. Friedman, Terry, and Turner envisioned a process that would eliminate all 
unnecessary steps, and the proposed process treated the Accounting Director's approval 
of every travel request as an unnecessary step. Jensen, however, did not want a 
reengineered process. Jensen described his vision this way: 
What I wanted was to get the orders here, where I could approve them, but 
then the DoD task force got started. Then we kind of stumbled on the 
damn thing. The whole problem with the DoD task force was that they 
were looking for a 500 percent solution. 
Jensen felt that the project team was simply responding to DoD guidance, and as a result, 
were being overzealous in their attempts to change the travel process. 
The team also briefed the School's Executive steering committee on 10 May. 
Major Friedman said that the team basically presented their proposal and made it clear that 
it if they were to proceed with the project, it was going to start costing the School money. 
Friedman said that following their brief, the ESC gave the team permission to proceed 
with the project. Shortly after this brief, Colonel Kendall became the project manager, and 
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he quickly designated Major Friedman as his project coordinator. 
Although the ESC gave Friedman permission to continue with the project, the 
committee did not give Friedman a time line for the project. The ESC's approval allowed 
the team to continue with the project, but the ESC offered no additional support. 
According to Terry and Turner, "During the brief, the ESC voiced support for the project, 
but offered no tangible resources." 
The ESC was also unwilling to direct that the School's administrative departments 
commit the personnel resources that Friedman felt was necessary. Beginning with the 
design phase, Friedman felt that the ESC should have mandated that team members spend 
more time working on the project than the allotted two hours per week. Months after this 
meeting with the ESC, Friedman recalled his fiustration: 
And that's a lack of commitment on all teams at JWTC. We cannot get the 
ESC to come out with a statement saying that, if you belong to a TQL 
team, or a reinvention team, or any other sort of team at JWTC, the team 
leader has you for, let's say, half your work week or one day of your work 
week. 
Terry also believed that the head of the ESC, the Commanding Officer, should 
have been more active in assisting the team. Because implementing a new travel 
management process would cross a number of functional boundaries, the project needed 
strong support from the School's senior leadership. Terry complained, 
If you had someone above them [the Director ofResource Management 
and the Director of Computer and Information Services] that was the true 
champion of it, making it happen, saying "Okay, What are the problems? 
Lets get to a solution," if you had someone driving it from above that really 
had a stake and was involved in it, I think it [the project's development] 
would happen quicker. I think the General is the logical champion for the 
program, and General Mitchell didn't exactly step up and take charge. 
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The ESC did not view the travel reengineering project as fulfilling an urgent need, 
and this fact affected their attitude towards travel management. It also decreased the 
likelihood of the project's success. In contrast to continuous improvement programs, 
Davenport ( 1993) points out that successful process innovation depends on a top-down 
leadership approach. 
Dr. Hendrick, who had been enthused by the prospect of making the travel 
management process "better, cheaper, and faster," thought that the project's founders 
were at least partly responsible for the amount of support that the travel team received. 
He felt that those who were involved with the project from its inception should have done 
more to impress upon the School's senior leadership the importance ofthe travel 
reinvention project. According to Hendrick, "We did not sell this as a high priority to the 
General, the Director of Academic Instruction, and Kendall. We needed to say that we 
want this to work." 
2. Government Regulations 
In order to reduce paperwork, the travel team flowcharted the ideal process under 
the assumption that the new process would allow the use of electronic signatures. The 
approval of electronic signatures would allow travelers to endorse travel documents by 
providing input to the software instead of hand signing travel paperwork. If, however, the 
use of electronic signatures was not approved, then the new travel management process 
would have to continue using paper copies of some documents in addition to the 
electronic documents produced by Travel Manager Plus. Friedman also wanted the new 
process to eliminate the requirement for the government to continue its current policy of 
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storing vouchers and receipts for seven years. 
Although the team recognized these potential obstacles, they were eventually 
resolved through JWTC's designation as a one of29 DoD travel pilot sites. For example, 
in November the federal government granted the Pentagon permission to change the 
threshold value of non-lodging receipts submitted with vouchers to $75 (Hudson, 1995). 
This rule change meant that the Navy no longer had to require that travelers turn in 
receipts greater than $25 with their travel vouchers. Friedman also noted that sometime 
after November, the IRS permitted DoD travel pilot sites to allow travelers to hold on to 
their own receipts rather than turning in receipts with their travel vouchers, which were 
then stored for seven years. In January 1996 the GAO approved Travel Manager's 
electronic signature capabilities for DoD travel pilot sites. Each of these policy changes 
was instrumental in shaping the travel management process that Friedman would 
eventually implement in the test departments. 
JWTC's April1995 DoD travel pilot site designation, however, also introduced 
some additional work for the team. Now the team not only had to ensure that its new 
process would satisfy current federal regulations, but it also had to reconcile its new travel 
management process against DoD and DoN travel reengineering guidance. At its 02 May 
meeting the team compared its proposed travel management flow chart to the DoN 
recommended flow chart. Although there were differences between the two, Friedman 
said that he and the team felt confident that the team had produced a process that was 
consistent with DoN travel reengineering guidelines. 
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Because the JWTC travel management reengineering team had already designed 
what it perceived to be the ideal process prior to receiving instructions from the DoD 
travel reengineering task force, Friedman, Terry, and Turner at times viewed the DoD's 
involvement as an impediment to their project's development. On 03 May Friedman told 
the JWTC team that, although the School would be allowed to pick its own travel 
management software, the DoD travel task force expected each command to prepare a 
travel baseline study before transitioning to a new process. The DoD intended for the 
baseline study to provide a basis of comparison between each command's original and 
reengineered travel management processes. 
To develop the baseline, the DoD wanted JWTC to attach a survey to each travel 
management document that would ask personnel involved in travel management to 
document how they supported the process. Because Terry and Turner had already 
performed a similar analysis, Friedman felt that the DoD's request was a waste oftime. 
Therefore, Friedman chose not to involve the team in developing the DoD's requested 
baseline study. He instead sent the DoD task force a response that according to Terry 
said, "We are not going to do it [a new baseline], but here's this [the work done by Turner 
and Terry]." 
3. Obtaining and Fitting the Travel Manager Plus Software to the 
Redesigned Process 
Major Friedman met with Colonel Kendall on 06 June to discuss the project and 
place a conference call with Federal Software, which was purchased by GELCO, 
concerning the contracting of the Travel Management software. Even though Major 
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Friedman had decided that the reengineered Travel Process would rely on some form of 
the Travel Manager software, the team still had a number of technical and implementation 
issues that needed to be resolved. For example, it was still unknown how to build an 
interface that would allow Travel Manager Plus to work directly with the Accounting 
Director's accounting database. In essence, the team spent much ofMay and June 
attempting to determine how to best implement an IT solution. The question that was 
asked at this point was how the functionality provided by Travel Manger Plus would fit 
into the redesigned process. Elliot points out the dilemma faced by the team members in 
attempting to apply Travel manager Plus to their solution: 
It's always difficult to get a packaged program and plunk it down into your 
system. The interfacing problems with something like travel management 
are fairly complicated. And travel management [Travel Manager] seems to 
be the best of the breed, but it's not complete; it doesn't, right now it 
doesn't have access to schedule databases or the price of airfare and that 
sort of thing. So, in order to solve the long term problem, we need some 
additional components in Travel Manager. The intention is to get them to 
have a direct input and interface with an airfare data base, direct link from 
Travel Manager into our accounting system, but we are a long way from 
doing that. Those are difficult problems. 
Although the team was ready to purchase the software for the redesigned process, 
Major Friedman waited until after the DoD trayel reengineering task force meeting to 
begin purchasing the software. The DoD Travel Reengineering Conference was held 26-
29 June in Springfield, VA, and both Turner and Friedman attended the meeting. 
Friedman stated, 
At that point, we were almost ready to start buying software and stuff right 
then, but they told us to hold off until after the conference. We went to the 
conference. They gave us some information. We basically got approval. 
Well so to speak, we really didn't need the approval, but they told us not to 
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put the brakes on any thing that we've done, and to press on. 
After the conference, Friedman provided the team the Statement ofWork (SoW) 
for the software contract. Team members were given during the 11 July meeting an 
opportunity to review the SoW, which was primarily a product of Friedman, Terry, and 
Turner's efforts. The actual order for the software was not sent out until August. 
Because the team had designed the new process to work over the campus's 
Banyan Vines network, they needed additional technical assistance from either Computer 
and Information Services, or the Resource Management technical staff According to 
Elliot, the original intent was to have Resource Management support the Travel Manager 
Plus installation, but they lacked the technical expertise to support the project's 
implementation. Elliot, however, stated, 
We hadn't worked it out very well: the responsibility between the user side, 
in this case, the Resource Management organization, and Computer and 
Information Services, ... but we haven't clearly defined what technical 
role they play and what technical role we play. 
Terry blamed the lack of clearly defined technical roles as one reason for what he 
perceived to be the project's slow progress. He felt that the Computer and Information 
Services organization should have taken the lead in installing the software and necessary 
interfaces. While suggesting ways to improve the project, Terry commented, 
I'd like to see Computer and Information Services Department more 
involved in the way of just making things happen without worrying what 
are the consequences of who should be doing what and are they going to 
upset another department ifthey step up and do this. They seemed to be 
concerned about you know, "this is really the Accounting Director's 
responsibility. Shouldn't they be in this part? We don't want to step into it 
when they should be doing that. We don't want to offend them." I'm not 
sure what all the conflict, or tensions between those two departments is but 
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I'd like to see the Computer and Information Services Department say, 
11 Y es we can do that, 11 and just make something happen without regard as 
to whether it will upset the Resource Management Director, or should they 
be doing it, or should the Resource Management Director be doing it. Just 
get something done. 
Davenport (1993) stresses that process innovation requires strong direction from 
senior management. 11 If this direction had existed, Elliot would likely have been more 
inclined to take action regardless of that action's impact on another department. Elliot did 
not work for Kendall, nor did Kendall work for Elliot. They both worked for the 
Commanding Officer. Therefore, if there was a question regarding implementation 
responsibilities, the Commanding Officer should have clarified who was responsible for 
ensuring that the Travel Manager software could operate over the campus-wide Banyan 
Vines network. 
4. Growing Frustration and the Decision to Disband the Travel 
Reengineering Team 
Although there were a number of tasks that needed to be accomplished even prior 
to testing the system in the test departments, the team decided that their weekly meetings 
were no longer required. For example, the team had intended for a software company to 
develop an interface between Travel Manager Plus and the Accounting Director's 
accounting database. Before a contractor could design an interface that would allow 
Travel Manager Plus to access and modify the Accounting Director's accounting system, 
JWTC needed to be able to accurately explain the structure of the database. The team, 
however, had been unable to locate sufficient corporate knowledge or documentation 
within JWTC to allow a contractor to develop the interface. Even with this and other 
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issues left outstanding, the team decided that it would be sufficient for them to meet on an 
"as needed basis" and use e-mail to provide updates. 
There was never an official announcement that the team meetings would stop, but 
following the 11 July meeting, the frequency ofthe meetings and the involvement by old 
team members in those meetings decreased. At least one team member felt that the team's 
work was in fact done and that there was nothing else to be gained by continuing the team 
meetings. 
I [Flood] think that it was just decided upon that at one point there wasn't 
too much more that we could do or discuss. It was more based on what 
GEL CO [the software provider] could do in getting the software to us and 
getting the departments going on it, you know trained or whatever else was 
involved. 
Flood believed that there was nothing for the team to do at this point. She assumed that 
the remaining implementation issues were primarily the responsibility of GELCO, the 
contractor responsible for Travel Manager Plus. 
It is also possible that the weekly meetings were terminated because Friedman was 
upset by the team's performance. Major Friedman had been growing increasingly 
frustrated because he felt that it was becoming too difficult to get the team members to 
perform their assigned tasks. While discussing Friedman's decision to stop the meetings, 
Terry recalled, "Friedman said that he didn't feel that the group was that productive." 
Friedman later attributed part ofthe team's performance to a lack of support from the 
School, commenting, "The School thinks that the reinvention thing is great, but there's no 
dedicated people ... and there's been no training." Friedman then described how he 
would have preferred the team worked: 
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As a team leader, I want to be able to task those individuals for eight hours 
of their work week, which is only a 20% commitment ... But in reality, 
even ifl could as team leader get somebody 50% of the time, that would 
be a significant improvement, but if you really, really, honestly want to see 
improvement, what you need to do is have a team leader, and he pulls 
those people out of those departments, and they work on that project. 
That level of commitment is no where near here. 
There is also evidence that Friedman felt that if he wanted something done, he 
would have to do it himself For example, although Friedman had been willing to use the 
team as a means of responding to request and directives from the DoD and DoN travel 
groups, he was becoming increasingly willing to forgo assistance from group members and 
proceed on his own. Terry said that he knew that their were additional taskings from the 
Navy travel group, but "he [Friedman] didn't let anybody know what was going on in the 
Navy [travel] group." Friedman's own comments allude to the fact that he felt that he 
could not rely on others for assistance: 
The follow up around this organization is dismal. Ifyou are not physically 
-you can call them up on the phone or send them e-mail- but ifyou are 
not physically standing at there door, or in a lot of cases, jumping up or 
down on their desk in order to get what you need, they'll blow you off 
Terry and Turner, who continued to assist Friedman after the team disbanded, 
were also unhappy with the manner in which the project had proceeded, and they placed 
most of the blame on the School's senior leadership. Prior to their September graduation, 
they wrote in their thesis an assessment of the project: 
In general, JWTC did not allocate adequate resources to the strategic 
planning, design, or implementation of the travel reinvention project. The 
travel reengineering team was essentially an ad hoc work group with no 
guidance, vision, or direction from a steering committee. The travel 
reengineering team was responsible for analyzing the current travel system 
and designing, procuring, testing, and implementing a totally new system. 
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The team attempted to do this by meeting approximately two hours per 
week while spending the remaining 38 hours of the work week at their 
"real" jobs. 
While their remarks do not specifically address the team's productivity, they do indicate 
that Terry and Turner thought that the School did little to positively influence the 
commitment of team members. Without a firm commitment from other team members, it 
is understandable why Friedman felt that he could not rely on the team. 
Terry, however, did not agree with Friedman's decision to stop the weekly team 
meetings. Prior to the 11 July meeting, Friedman met with Terry and Turner to discuss 
the possibility of terminating the weekly meetings. Terry says that he felt uncomfortable 
with the idea: 
Frankly, I disagreed with the idea, but Richard [Turner] agreed. After that, 
he [Friedman] was really in a horrible position. Essentially you had a 
Lieutenant Coronel select working on the project with no personnel 
resources. Even after graduation, I didn't work for him. I worked for Dr. 
Elliot, and I really didn't have to do anything for Friedman. 
5. The Selection of the Test Departments 
In addition to deciding to terminate the weekly meetings, on 11 July the team 
agreed that they needed to set up meetings with the three test departments. These three 
departments were initially International Relations, Information systems, and 
Communications Systems. The team agreed that it would be best to have a separate 
meeting with each ofthe departments to discuss test plans. LT Ferguson and Major 
Friedman agreed to work on setting up the meetings with the individual departments. 
The Accounting Director's office controlled the selection of the test sites. That 
office chose the Communications Systems and Information Systems departments because 
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those departments are relatively small and had travel administrators who had used the 
Financial version of Travel Manager. The Director did agree to the team's request to also 
use International Relations as a test department. Terry says that they felt that the 
International Relations Department was a suitable candidate because of its size and the 
fact that their travel clerk, Sharon Howell, was a member of the travel reengineering team. 
6. The Initial Meetings with the Test Departments 
Friedman, Terry, Turner, and Ferguson began their meetings with the departmental 
test sites in July. On 27 July, Friedman, Terry, Turner, and Ferguson met with the 
International Relations Department's secretary, who was the acting travel clerk, and 
Director to discuss the use of Travel Manager and the new responsibilities involved with 
its implementation. Terry claimed that they began with the International Relations 
Department because they assumed that it was going to be one of the first test sites; 
however, because the department's secretary later moved to a different department, the 
International Relations Department was eventually removed from the test site list. 
Friedman and Ferguson also gave a general briefing to the other test departments. 
These briefs were not yet intended for the department's instructors. Terry said that the 
purpose of the briefings was to present "the basics, the idea is we want to use you; we 
want to use your department in our test plan." Turner and Terry referred to this phase as 
marketing. 
In September Major Friedman continued briefing the test departments on 
implementation issues. The briefs centered around providing the test departments with a 
status of the project and an approximate implementation time line. Friedman also 
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discussed some proposals on simplified entitlements and how these might affect the travel 
management system. 
Although Turner left the School following his and Terry's September graduation, 
Terry remained to work on the project. He and Friedman had the Travel Manager 
software installed on a set of computers at the School in October, and, during the first 
week of October, they held a system administrator course at the School for the test 
departments' administrative assistants responsible for travel. At this point the test 
departments still consisted oflnternational Relations, Information Systems, and 
Communication Systems Departments. 
7. The Test Plan 
Because JWTC's travel reengineering project was a pilot program belonging to the 
larger DoD travel reengineering program, the School had to provide the DoD program 
coordinators an outline of the School's test plan. On 01 November, Colonel Kendall sent 
the DoD travel reengineering task force the School's travel reengineering test plan. The 
plan did not detail how testing would proceed, but it did contain a test objective section 
that outlined the purpose of the new system and how it was supposed to operate. This 
section ofthe test plan came directly from the research of Terry and Turner. 
The plan included a list of travel reengineering team members who would be 
responsible for implementing Travel Manager, but these team members never met as a 
group. Members of the team did continue to work on the project. However, Terry and 
Flood agree they never held formal group meetings similar to the team meetings held 
during the projects early stages. 
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---- -------------------------------------, 
According to the test plan, Roberta Lopez, who had been working with the 
Accounting Director's old Financial Version of Travel Manager, was to begin working for 
Major Friedman. Because Lopez was familiar with the Accounting Director's automated 
accounting system and the older version of Travel Manager, Friedman needed her 
assistance if he was to continue with the new system's implementation. Friedman wanted 
Lopez to verify that the software was operating correctly, assist in the installation of the 
software in the test departments, and hold end-user training. 
Lopez, however, retained some of her responsibilities within the Accounting 
Director's office. As the system administrator for the Accounting Director's automated 
accounting system, she was also needed to keep that system operational. Therefore, when 
the Accounting Director's automated accounting system began to malfunction in early 
November, the Accounting Director had Lopez devote her efforts to fixing the 
Accounting Department's system. According to Friedman, "She got pulled basically off of 
Travel Manager to fix the local accounting system, and we basically couldn't proceed any 
further." 
Although Friedman understood that Lopez was needed to repair the Accounting 
Director's system, her temporary departure demonstrates why he frequently complained 
about not having adequate personnel resources. Beginning with the first team meetings, 
Friedman felt that he could not rely upon the School to provide him with assigned 
personnel who were sufficiently dedicated and skilled in creating a new process. As a 
result, Friedman came to expect that he could only rely upon himself, Terry, and Turner. 
While discussing his experiences with the project, Friedman explained his situation this 
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way: 
We have not got that commitment, and we've been asking for it for over a 
year. That's why, essentially, what it boils down to is that the military has 
acted as free labor in this. I'm not saying we have done everything, but we 
have done the bulk of the work. The creation of the test plans, the creation 
of the briefs, creations of any other paperwork that needed to be gotten. 
Correspondence, statements of works, all that stuff has been pretty much 
handled by the three of us on the military side of things. But again, not 
totally. But the vast percentage. 
8. Testing 
Friedman and Terry met frequently with Lopez in December. Using the software 
that had been installed in October, they attempted to determine if they could find any 
problem areas with how Travel Manager was functioning. Travel Manager Plus had still 
not been installed in any academic departments at this point, but Friedman explained that 
they were busy familiarizing Lopez with the software and ensuring that it operated 
correctly: 
Basically Glenn and I took her [Roberta Lopez] in hand and set her down, 
and we started going through bunches of stuff with Travel Manager. We 
went through the routing stuff to check it out, we went through the 
computational module, did some scenarios, and had PSD check some of 
those out. Everything looked good there. And we also did some budget 
module checks. 
The purpose of this early testing was to use Lopez's expertise to ensure that Travel 
Manager Plus would accurately route and compute travel accounting data. 
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J. IMPLEMENTATION BEGINS 
1. The Reaction of Instructors to the Proposed Process 
Prior to implementing the new system within the test departments, Friedman 
scheduled end-user training for the test-department instructors. Friedman attempted to 
explain during these training sessions the concept of the new process. He also wanted to 
describe the new procedures instructors would be expected to follow as part of the new 
travel management process. 
Although the instructors had not yet used the new process and software to manage 
a trip, Friedman began to encounter early signs of resistance from the instructors. 
Friedman thought that it was important to train the instructors because in the process 
designed by the team, instructors would be using the software, not departmental travel 
clerks. However, according to Friedman, some instructors were not eager to adopt the 
new method of managing travel: 
We've given three briefs in the Communications Systems Department, and 
not even all the instructors in the Communications Systems Department 
came to the briefs. We had one instructor get up and walk out because he 
didn't want to have a thing to do with it. They view it as a work shift, 
which in a manner of speaking, it is. 
2. The First Test Departments 
Friedman, Terry, and Lopez implemented Travel Manager in the Communications 
Systems Department during the first few weeks of January 1996. Although 
Communications Systems was the first test department to receive Travel Manager, the 
department was able to successfully process travel authorizations and vouchers shortly 
after the installation of the software. 
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On 31 January, Friedman wrote Kendall that they were finishing preparations to 
implement Travel Manager in the Information Systems Department, and on the same date 
he and Terry briefed the Information Systems department on what actions they would 
need to take prior to implementing Travel Manager in their department. He also told 
Kendall that Lopez would need to continue providing the quality assurance for the 
installation, particularly the accounting lines within the Information Systems Department's 
Travel Manager software. 
3. Friedman and Terry's Trip to Washington 
Friedman and Terry demonstrated the capabilities of the Travel Manager Plus 
software by using it to manage their January trip to D.C. for a travel reengineering 
conference. Friedman described the performance of the program this way: 
We [Terry and Friedman] sat down at our computer, created our own 
travel authorizations, and ... we got back off of our trip. We entered the 
information. Basically what you do is from your travel authorization, you 
hit a key and it goes voucher from authorization, and by doing so, all 
you've got to do is go in and change what you actually spent ... You add 
those in, and the software automatically computes the voucher for you. 
Although the electronic interface between the CTO (Commercial Travel Office, which at 
JWTC is SATO) and the test departments still had not been installed and tested, and there 
was still no method to directly access the Accounting Director's database using Travel 
Manger Plus, their trip demonstrated that the School could begin using portions of the 
redesigned travel management process. 
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While in Washington, Friedman, Terry, and members from the other DoD test sites 
met with GELCO and SATO to view the software that the CTO could use to 
communicate with a traveler's personal computer or work station. The plan at JWTC was 
to have SATO use this portion of the interface to build a traveler's itinerary and generate 
should-cost estimates for the trip. The CTO could then send these items back to a 
traveler's department for review. 
Terry and Friedman also discussed the performance of the School's installed 
software with GELCO. Terry said that they told GELCO that the School was having 
problems with the software budget module, including the fact that Travel Manger Plus 
allowed departments to overspend on travel. Although they discussed the budget modules 
performance at this meeting, five months later travel clerks were still complaining that the 
software would allow their departments to overspend. 
4. Friedman's Follow-up Report 
Following their visit in Washington, Major Friedman wrote in his trip report that 
JWTC was slated to be the test site for the CTO interface. He also added, 
We also need to start laying out the ground work for displaced workers. 
Once we prove out the CTO [SATO] interface, our local SATO office will 
be able to create authorizations with the traveler over the phone. My 
suggestion is that once the test of the interface is complete and proves 
satisfactory that we require the traveler create their own travel 
authorization [using Travel Manager] or they create it over the phone with 
SATO. 
Not everyone was pleased with Friedman's recommendations. Friedman described some 
of the responses he received as a result of the suggestions he made in his January trip 
report: "I'm not going to name individuals, but I've been approached by several 
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individuals saying, 'don't ever put anything like that in a report again."' 
Although Friedman refused to elaborate on the incident, it is possible that those 
who read the report were concerned that it might have created an unnecessary panic. In a 
February memorandum, Major General Mike Engle, who relieved Mitchell as the school's 
superintendent, admitted that some positions would be affected by attempts to reinvent 
processes at the School, but he also added that eliminating a person's employment would 
be a last resort to other options. Friedman's report, however, did not address other 
options, such as job retraining. 
Friedman viewed the issue of travel clerks as being a straightforward decision to 
eliminate travel clerks. In the absence of prior guidance on how to address the issue of 
displaced personnel, Friedman felt that his written remarks were completely justified 
because his process vision was based upon removing inefficiencies. Friedman explained 
during an interview the reasoning for his suggestion: 
We've got to start thinking about this 'cause this is the whole idea, folks. 
We've got to reduce costs. We got to start planning out this stuff It may 
be a year or two before the real DoD system gets to JWTC, but, by God, 
when it does arrive, you are going to need to eliminate labor. We've got to 
start working smarter, and you don't need a travel clerk in the middle. No 
longer will a traveler need to go to his travel clerk to work out his travel 
arrangement. 
Friedman described the response he received to his report as originating from fear. 
He also felt that the School, particularly civilian employees, were unwilling to address the 
issue of eliminating jobs. Expressing his frustration, Friedman remarked: 
The military is in more favor of this than the civilians. The military rolls in 
and out. We've done our downsizing in the military. We haven't gotten to 
all of the civilians yet. We downsized a lot of civilians, but JWTC hasn't 
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downsized shit. How many staff do we have at the School? Two for every 
student. Isn't that insane ... Well, all the DoD downsizing, all the VSis, 
early retirement, and all that, the bottom line, guys, was that it was a RIF 
[reduction in force]. You mention that around here ... well, pretty much, 
you don't mention that word around here. That's what we need. We need 
a RIF. Until somebody stands up and says we're going to RIF so many 
employees this year, you better get onboard. And, by God, you employees 
better start pulling your weight. 
5. The Commercial Travel Office Interface 
On 23 February Friedman reported that the School had successfully tested the 
CTO interface. With the CTO interface now in place and operational, a traveler or a 
person who handled travel management had an electronic interface with SATO. SATO 
could take a travelers request, load the request on to a floppy disk, put the floppy into 
another computer, access the SABER system, and build a traveler's itinerary using 
information from SABER. Travelers could also call SATO directly to request an itinerary 
with cost estimates be generated for them. This information could then be sent back to 
the traveler's office for authorization. 
6. The Decision to Add Logistics Management Department as the Fourth 
Test Department 
The Accounting Department had originally stipulated in July that the Logistics 
Management Department not be used as a test site. It is not clear whether the Logistics 
Management Department had even asked to be a test site during the July meetings, but is 
apparent that there was some concern about the potential problems in attempting to test 
the new system in Logistics Management . These concerns included the risk associated 
with the large size of that academic department, the volume of travel orders generated by 
the department, and the perceived reluctance of the department's travel clerk to acclimate 
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to a new system. 
Although Lopez did not anticipate training Logistics Management end-users until 
later in the summer, Friedman said that sometime during the month ofFebruary, he and 
Kendall, the Director of Resource Management, decided to allow Logistics Management 
to be the fourth test site. Although we were unable to determine precisely why there was 
a change in the implementation plan with respect to Logistics Management, several factors 
help explain the tum around. 
Both Kendall and Friedman mentioned that there was strong support for the new 
system from the Logistics Management Department. According to Kendall, "Logistics 
Management would tum it on tomorrow if we let them, if they were able to." Friedman 
explained that he and Kendall made the decision to add Logistics Management because 
"Logistics Management has pleaded and begged and said that we'll do a bunch of the 
work and set-up for you to allow us to come on the system." 
In addition to the Logistics Management Department's offer of support, Friedman 
had a better idea of how the new system would operate. Therefore, the risks of 
implementing the new travel management process in a large academic department, such as 
Logistics Management, were not as great as they had been in July. The Logistics 
Management's travel clerk, Roberta Thomas, was also planning on retiring in April. 
Roberta had worked as a travel clerk for JWTC for nine years and was content 
with how she was currently managing Logistics Management department's travel. 
According to Thomas, any attempt to implement Travel Manger Plus within Logistics 
Management department would have been a "waste oftime." As a justification for her 
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reasoning, Thomas listed several factors which she felt made her department unsuitable as 
a test site. These included: 
• Her busy schedule made it impossible to attend training sessions or learn 
how to use a new system. 
• She was due to retire in the Spring. 
• She felt that Logistics Management department was too slow in adopting 
new systems and procedures, and therefore the implementation of a new 
travel management process would represent an unacceptable loss of work 
hours. 
With the addition ofLogistics Management, Friedman had to oversee the testing of 
Travel Manager Plus in four departments. While describing the decision to add Logistics 
Management, Friedman said, "The project isn't going to go any further than four 
departments unless we get more money and more people because we've pretty much 
tapped out our resources on are software at this point." Friedman added, "So we basically 
doubled our test population by accepting the fourth department." 
Although Friedman did not mention any failed requests for additional funding, he 
felt that the project was already understaffed and that the School would not willing to 
provide additional personnel support. As proof, he described JWTC' s project relative to 
the National Security Agency's (NSA) travel reinvention program: "As far as level of 
commitment, just to give you a little bit of indication, the NSA has had a full-time staff of 
six people working on this for the last two years." 
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7. The Decision to Eliminate the International Relations Department from 
the Test Plan 
Sometime after Friedman and Kendall made the decision to add Logistics 
Management, they decided to remove International Relations from the test plan. It is not 
clear why or precisely when the decision was made to drop the International Relations 
Department. Sharon Howell's involvement on the travel reinvention team was one reason 
why the travel team originally chose her department as a test site. Howell had transferred 
from International Relations to a different department, but her transfer happened months 
earlier. She continued to work with the team after her transfer, and the implementation 
plan still included International Relations. 
Friedman's replacement, Captain Sally Rudman, a September graduate from the 
Information Systems Department, thought that the department was eliminated because 
they lacked sufficient computer resources. Rudman believed that the International 
Relations department was dropped sometime in March because " the department director 
didn't even have a computer on his desk." Terry, however, later commented that he 
thought that personnel problems within the International Relations department caused it to 
be dropped as a test site. 
8. Friedman Transfers 
Colonel Kendall identified Friedman's replacement in February. In the beginning 
ofFebruary, Friedman said that he was uncertain who would replace him, but added, "To 
tell you the truth, it will not be another military 'cause I'm an excess billet." Friedman's 
replacement, however, was another military member, Captain Rudman, who had been 
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working in the School's Computer and Information Services Department. On February 
23, Kendall explained the series of events that allowed him to obtain Captain Rudman for 
the project: 
His relief, Captain Sally Rudman, will work for me ... we've already 
attrited one civilian employee based on this thing coming along. She 
wanted to retire so I elected not to fill the position. As a matter of fact, the 
money that we free up - there's no free money - the money that we free up 
from not hiring her will be used to hire a replacement over in Computer 
and Information Services to replace Captain Rudman because Friedman is 
not getting a replacement. 
Friedman began his turnover with Rudman in March, and Rudman relieved him as 
the Travel Reinvention Coordinator in April. Prior to departing from the School, 
Friedman described to us how he viewed himself in relation to the project. His remarks 
summarize what he felt was instrumental in keeping the project moving: 
You know, I view it as I've got the stick and the whip to keep it moving. 
I'm doing all the stuff: the one-on-ones with the software company to keep 
the guys moving, keeping SATO moving .... Just trying to keep an 
overall view ofthe progress ofthe program, and keeping everybody 
moving, not letting the program die, which it could die very easily if there 
was nobody pushing it along, both internally and externally. 
K. ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS UNRESOLVED IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
1. Technical Issues 
In addition to trying to familiarize herself with the new system, Rudman had to 
address a number of unresolved implementation issues. The interface between the test 
department's Travel Manager Plus software and the Accounting Director's accounting 
database still had not been developed. Some instructors did not have computers with 
operating systems that could support using the current version of Travel Manager Plus. 
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According to a message that Captain Rudman received from The Director ofEngineering 
and Computational Studies, "95 percent of our faculty do not have a Banyan connection in 
their office. This means that the default mode will still be to rely on the department travel 
clerk." In addition, the test departments were just beginning to discover some problems 
with the new process. The test department travel clerks, for example, discovered that the 
software would not allow them to recoup travel funds from canceled trips. 
To assist in resolving these issues, Rudman decided to hold regular meetings with 
the test departments' travel clerks. Rudman could also rely on Roberta Lopez as a source 
of information. After Friedman left JWTC, Lopez continued to work for the travel 
reinvention coordinator, working exclusively on Travel Manager Plus. However, unlike 
Friedman, Rudman could not rely on Terry for assistance. Terry left the School for 
civilian employment shortly after Rudman became the new Travel Reinvention 
Coordinator. 
2. The Meeting with the DoD Travel Reengineering Task Force Director 
On 16 April, Kate Asken met with personnel :from the School who were involved 
in travel reengineering. Ms. Asken was the DoD Travel Reengineering Task Force 
Director. Commander (CDR) Joseph Tasner, the DoN representative on the DoD Travel 
Reengineering Task Force, accompanied Asken on her visit to the School. The following 
personnel from the School attended the meeting with Asken and Tasner: Rudman, 
Whitaker, LT Dolores Silber (who replaced Ferguson as the PSD OIC), Jensen, and three 
students. 
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Ms. Asken and CDR Tasner provided the group general information about the 
DoD's efforts to reengineer the travel management process. They were also interested in 
learning how JWTC was progressing with its local efforts, and they wanted provide any 
additional information or guidance that would clarify implementation policies that the 
school found confusing. For example, Silber told the group that her office was under the 
impression that they were required to perform audits on all Travel Manager Plus travel 
vouchers that travelers sent to PSD, which is tantamount to redoing every travel voucher 
calculation. Asken explained that, when using the Travel Manager Plus's computational 
module, it was not necessary to audit every voucher. Tasner added that he would send 
Silber the necessary authorization paperwork so that she would only have to perform 
occasional audits. 
The group also discussed the technical issues which were affecting the progress of 
the project's implementation. Rudman informed Asken that the development ofTravel 
Manager's interface with the Accounting Directors accounting system had been delayed 
and that the reason for this delay was that the Accounting Director expected to change to 
another accounting database system. Rudman then briefed Asken on the different 
electronic funds transfer (EFT) payment options for travelers that the School was 
considering. 
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L. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NEW TRAVEL MANAGEMENT 
PROCESS AND THE END-USERS 
1. Proposed Changes in the Relationship Between Instructors and the 
Travel Management Process 
Under the old travel management process, instructors picked up a travel request 
worksheet from their department's travel clerk. They then completed specific portions of 
the travel request and returned the worksheet to their travel clerk. The items on the 
worksheet that instructors were expected to complete include the following: 
• personal information, e.g., name, telephone number, social security number 
• funding information, e.g., job order number, registration fees, request for 
travel advances 
• trip information, e.g., dates of travel, requested departure and arrival times, 
airline seating preference, destination, requests for lodging and rental car, 
and the purpose of the trip 
After completing his or her portion of the form, a traveler had the department director 
approve the requested trip and returned the form to the travel clerk. The travel clerk 
would then be responsible for completing the form, including the trip's estimated costs, 
and obtaining funding approval from the Accounting Department. Although there are 
additional steps prior to a traveler receiving an itinerary and tickets, an instructor only 
needed to complete his or her portion of the worksheet prior to departing on a trip. 
After returning from a trip, a traveler needed to complete a one-page travel 
voucher. Using the voucher, the traveler listed the trip's actual itinerary and expenses. A 
completed voucher allowed PSD to pay the traveler for any reimbursable expenses that 
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exceeded the traveler's travel advance. Appendix B contains examples oftravel forms 
used with the old process. 
To request a trip using the new process, instructors would begin by logging into 
the Travel Manager Plus software. In order for instructors to gain access to the program, 
they would first need to enter an electronic signature and password. After logging on to 
the system, instructors would then need to complete a series of online forms that required 
information similar to what they and a travel clerk had provided using the older travel 
request worksheets. Instructors could only access the correct online forms by selecting 
the appropriate option from a series of pull-down menus displayed at the top of the screen. 
In order to successfully complete the travel request so that SATO could generate airline, 
lodging, and rental car cost estimates, instructors would need to know which of the online 
forms and data fields were applicable to their trip. 
Because the trip's anticipated cost, which is calculated by the software using per-
diem rates and SATO's airline, lodging, and rental car cost estimates, might exceed 
allowable limits, instructors would need to periodically access the software to determine if 
their department director had rejected their travel request. If the travel request was 
approved, travelers would also need to periodically check Travel Manager Plus to 
determine if their tickets were available for pickup. 
After completing a trip, instructors would again need to access Travel Manager 
Plus. They would select the program's "voucher" option by following a series of pull-
down menus. Travel Manager Plus carries pre-trip data over into the post-trip voucher 
form. Therefore, instructors would only need to modify pre-trip cost data so that it 
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correctly reflected their actual expenses. Appendix C contains examples of some Travel 
Manager Plus screen displays. 
2. The Instructor's Belief that the Process Could not be Improved 
While she was at the School, Asken was also interested in hearing about 
organizational issues that the group felt were hampering efforts to implement the new 
travel management process. This discussion focused primarily on resistance from the 
School's instructors, and there was considerable disagreement on why instructors were 
unhappy with the use of the new system. Whitaker said that one problem with the new 
system was that the instructors didn't believe it would be an improvement over the current 
system: "The problem is one of trust. The trust is not there, and that's what is getting in 
the way. They don't trust the system not to screw up their trip." Whitaker also added, 
"The resistance is not necessarily towards the new system , but hatred for the current 
system." Whitaker felt that the instructors' resistance could be mitigated by showing them 
an improvement relative to the old system: "If we can get people onboard with the belief 
that things will get better, we will win." 
According to Kanter et al. (1992), the instructors' doubts are common to change 
recipients. They claim that change recipients often feel that talk of change will not result 
in positive action. Change recipients are also likely to feel that they will have to endure the 
anxiety and extra effort of the change process with no definite improvement to their or the 
organization's situation. (Kanter et al., 1992) 
The instructors' doubts help explain why so few instructors' attended the training 
sessions held by Friedman and Lopez. Even with classes, Friedman felt that three 
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meetings should have allowed most of the approximately 25 instructors in the 
Communication Systems Department to attend at least one training session. Change 
recipients, however, are unlikely to attend a non-mandatory meeting for a change that they 
anticipate will be unsuccessful. Lopez commented that, based on her experiences with the 
Communications Systems and Information Systems departments, she anticipated light 
attendance by the instructors during the Logistics Management Department training 
sessions. 
After the Communications Systems and Information Systems test departments 
gained exposure to the new travel management process, the instructors developed a better 
appreciation of the new travel management system's impact. This exposure likely 
reinforced their perception that the School could not make the travel management process 
better. For example, Rudman acknowledged that many test department instructors do not 
have personal computers connected to the campus-wide Banyan Vines Network; 
therefore, these instructors continue to rely on travel clerks to assist in processing their 
travel paperwork. Each of the test departments still has at least one travel clerk, and these 
travel clerks claim that they continue to manage a large portion of the instructors' travel 
requirements. In addition, the Communications Systems department continues to have 
instructors use an old departmental paper form to request travel. 
3. The Instructors' Perception that Things Got Worse, Not Better 
Whitaker's assertion that the instructors do not believe that the travel project will 
result in a better process is valid, but the meeting with Asken also addressed another 
possible reason for the instructors' reactions to the new system. The group discussed the 
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possibility that the instructors did not like the new system because they viewed it as a 
work shift. Even though the implementation of the new system was incomplete, test 
department instructors were still more actively involved in managing their own travel than 
they had been previously. Tasner stated that he had seen a similar reluctance on the part 
of Naval War College instructors to involve themselves in processes that had, until 
recently, been the responsibility of the office staff 
Before he left the School, Friedman said that he realized that the project was far 
from complete, but he viewed favorably the changes made so far. The new process had 
eliminated some paperwork. It gave the test department directors the authority to obligate 
travel funds. It automated portions of the travel request and authorization process, and it 
provided for relatively prompt payment of travel expenses. 
Test department instructors, however, viewed these changes from the perspective 
of change recipients, not as project founders or implementers. Kanter et al. (1992) state 
that, in addition to initially feeling that positive change is unlikely, change recipients are 
also likely to ask, "What's in it for us?" Change recipients want to know if their 
participation benefits them. 
The new process would require instructors to perform additional work, but before 
leaving the School, Friedman said that he felt that quicker travel reimbursement would 
mitigate any ill feelings resulting from the extra work. According to Friedman, the new 
process would create a "work shift," but "it also prevents them from having to fill out the 
damn piece of paper [the voucher, which is required for post-travel payment] and handing 
it to the travel clerk and waiting weeks." Friedman was also aware that some instructors 
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were unhappy with the user unfriendliness of the software. He assumed that reducing the 
time delay between travel completion and payment also compensated for the software's 
weak user interface: 
Well, a lot offolks view it as potentially not being that user friendly .... 
I'm not saying that it's the greatest thing. There's supposed to be a 
Windows version coming out here within about four to six months that will 
improve the user friendliness of it. But, the biggest advantage of it is that 
the more time you spend on your travel authorization, the less time you 
spend on your voucher .... That's the nice feature about the software, 
that you take your travel authorization and tum it into a voucher. That is 
the really super nice feature of the software. 
Friedman was overly optimistic. The instructors that we talked to did not view 
prompt payment to be a significant improvement. To make this point, one instructor 
retrieved a several week old travel check from his wallet and stated, "See, I don't care 
about that." 
Terry envisioned a system that would make the process easier for the traveler, and 
the Travel Reengineering Test Plan signed by Colonel Kendall lists "100% [user] 
satisfaction" as one of the project's goals. However, several instructors complained that 
the opposite has happened. In those cases where instructors have used the new process 
and witnessed a significant change attributable to the new process, they primarily view that 
change as negatively impacting them. A instructor in the Information Systems Department 
said that the new process provided "zero percent customer satisfaction ... zilch, zero," 
and Linda Bautista, the Communications Systems Department travel clerk, explained that 
when instructors do use the new system, they frequently complain about the difficulty of 
using it. 
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The Travel Manager Plus software seemed to be the main source of the 
instructors' complaints. On May 15, we had the opportunity to witness the reaction of 
one instructor in Bautista's department towards the new travel management process. 
While Bautista was giving us a demonstration of the Travel Manager Plus software, an 
instructor entered the room to complain about the new system. He was frustrated that the 
system required him to provide an electronic signature on his travel voucher and that the 
required electronic signature was not identical to the signature that he normally used. 
After the travel clerk explained that his electronic signature consisted of four digits, which 
he had previously chosen, appended to his name, he responded, "How would I know that? 
Where does it tell me that? That's not my signature. It asks for my signature!" 
Because this instructor thought that we had helped in the design of the new travel 
management system, he then turned to us and exclaimed, "I'm not yelling at her; I'm 
yelling at you! " The instructor explained that he felt that the system had been designed to 
help administrators, not the users. He then listed some ofhis specific complaints, which 
included: 
• the software's semantics were confusing 
• the lack of a user's manual 
• frequent system crashes 
• an increased workload for him as a result ofthe system's implementation 
Jesse Alverez, an instructor in the Information Systems Department, voiced similar 
complaints. According to Alverez, "The problem with it [the user interface] is that it's not 
intuitive." He also explained that the software would occasionally lock-up causing delays 
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in the processing of his travel requests, and he added, "I can't get it [Travel Manager Plus] 
to recognize what I'm trying to do." Because the software was difficult for him to use, 
Alverez said that the new process created an excessive administrative burden relative to 
the old travel management process: 
For me to travel using the old process it would take about fifteen minutes 
to fill out the travel paperwork. The first time it [using the new process 
and software] took about one hour and 45 minutes ... but it [using the 
new process and software] has never taken less than one hour of my time. 
It is not constructive for me to spend all of this time on this. It does not 
contribute to education. I don't see why we need to suck faculty out of 
their regular jobs and put them in administrative jobs. 
Alverez said that he wasn't opposed to the concept of changing the travel 
management process. He did feel, however, that for a new process to be effective, the 
software would need to be designed to better support the traveler: "It's a wonderful idea, 
but they really need to have somebody write the program that is familiar with travel." 
Alverez added that given the option of using the new system or reverting to the old 
process, he would "rather pay a secretary out of research funds than eat up an hour of my 
time." He then summarized his feeling about the new process: "The concept is good, but 
the execution sucks!" 
4. Consensus That The Instructors Were Displeased With the New Travel 
Management Process 
Whatever the cause of their resistance, the meeting with Asken did make it clear 
that the instructors were unhappy with travel management at JWTC. In addition to the 
remarks made by Whitaker, Silber said that she frequently had instructors coming to PSD 
to complain about their travel payments. Although she admitted that she had some 
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successes with the new system, there had been other times when she had "people 
screaming in her office about how I've screwed up their trip" and "treating me like pond 
scum." 
5. How Others Viewed the Instructors' Reactions to the New Process 
Because those who speak out against a new process are often willing to act on 
their feelings, Kanter et al. (1992) warn that change strategist and implementers need to 
listen to the complaints of change recipients. It is not enough, however, to hear change 
recipients' concerns and simply dismiss them as being irrational or self-centered. The 
concerns expressed by the instructors may point to serious, unforseen flaws with the 
system. Bridges (1990) also warns that attempts to suppress or ignore change recipients' 
negative reactions delay the effected personnel's progression from a period of feeling loss 
to a period of transition. Therefore, the School should have adopted an environment 
where the instructors reactions were anticipated, acknowledged, and understood. 
With the exception of the meeting with Asken, we did not witness any other 
attempts to understand the instructors' frustration. This fact is partially explained by the 
initial belief that the instructors would have little trouble in using the new system. 
Kendall and Friedman thought that the new process would be easy for the instructors to 
use. Friedman stated that the new process is "not that difficult," and in February Colonel 
Kendall said, 
I'm not sure that I agree with that [the idea of instructors possibly resisting 
the new process] necessarily. You know, if you're a instructor and all of a 
sudden you decide that I'm going to do my own travel orders rather than 
pass it to a clerk to do, than yeah, you are going to have to get a little 
initial training .... It's relatively easy to make the thing run. It doesn't 
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take a whole lot ofbrain power for an individual to set himself up a set of 
orders. 
Elliot's comments had been even more positive: "There's certainly a lot ofinterest in 
getting it running. There's no lack of support from the user community." 
Before leaving JWTC, Friedman said that he recognized that not all travelers were 
going to be happy with the new process. He stressed, however, that the test departments 
were part of an effort to identify weaknesses with the new process and correct them. He 
also stressed that customer feedback was an important aspect of correcting the problems: 
The concept and software are not 100 percent yet, but the key thing that 
people have got to remember here is that this is a test. We are testing new 
interfaces. We are testing new concepts. We're testing new software. 
The software is still under development. I mean we are going to get 
customer feedback and [that] basically says, "You need to change this, 
[and] you need to fix this." 
As the implementation proceeded, however, few people took the instructors 
complaints seriously. Instead of attempting to understand the reasoning behind the 
instructors' negative reactions, those individuals that we spoke to about the instructors' 
behavior attributed the instructors' negative reactions to either a lack of conunitment, 
egotism, or inflexibility. Friedman felt that the instructors found the new process difficult 
to use because they were not committed to the training. Bautista, who said that she 
frequently had to listen to the instructors complain about travel management, blamed their 
attitude on their "egotistical" nature. Rudman felt that the instructors would never be 
happy with any system that restricted them. According to Rudman, the instructors wanted 
nothing but a "should cost system," a system that would only tell them how much their 
trip should cost and allow them the freedom to manage their travel as they saw fit. Jensen 
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implied that any attempt to please the instructors would have been useless: "They are 
never going to be happy with it [the new travel management process]." 
6. The Reaction of Travel Clerks to the New Process 
Unlike the instructors, the test department travel clerks were more positive in their 
assessment of the new travel management process and its related software. They brought 
to Rudman's attention software issues that they felt needed resolution, but during the 
three travel clerk meetings that we attended, none of the travel clerks indicated that the 
new travel management process made their jobs more difficult. Bautista gave the most 
positive endorsement of the new project. According to Bautista, the new process is 
"heads and shoulders above the old." She later added, "It's like being a pioneer. It's 
exciting to be one of the founding fathers." 
Several factors explain why the travel clerks' reacted differently than the 
instructors. Firstly, the travel clerks were familiar with the Travel Manager Plus software 
interface. Although the interface had some new features, according to Terry, it was 
basically the same interface that had existed with the older Financial Version of Travel 
Manager, which the Communications Systems and Information Systems travel clerks had 
before the new process was designed. Secondly, the Logistics Management travel clerk 
who attended the travel clerk meetings with Rudman had little prior experience with 
managing travel. He was unfamiliar with how the old travel management process 
operated. Therefore, his use of the new travel management process did not conflict with 
any beliefs or work habits relating to the old travel management process. Finally, the 
travel clerks had been involved with implementing the new process more extensively than 
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the instructors. Not only did Friedman familiarize them with the new process before the 
instructors, they also had a weekly chance to interact directly with the project coordinator. 
Through their recommendations and feedback, they were effectively helping Rudman 
continue the implementation. As Bridges (1990) points out, while not a panacea, 
participation in the change process helps people accept change more readily. 
Nonetheless, the travel clerks were confronted with a change, and this change 
caused some form of loss. Bridges (1990) states, however, that people vary in their 
reactions to loss. Therefore, the travel clerks should react differently than the instructors. 
Also, because the Communications Systems and Information Systems travel clerks were 
exposed to the new process before the instructors, they had the opportunity to move 
beyond the period ofloss described in Bridge's three-step change model. The 
Communications Systems and Information Systems travel clerks may have initially reacted 
negatively to the new system, but we talked to them in May, at least seven months after 
they received their first training on the new process. 
Because the new process is not yet fully implemented, there will be more changes 
for the travel clerks. One possibility is that they may move to a different job if the new 
process becomes fully implemented. Although Friedman had stressed the need to 
eliminate jobs, none of the test department travel clerks expressed worries that they might 
lose their employment at the School. According to the Deputy Director ofthe School's 
Human Resource Office, the Commanding Officer had made his policy clear, and that 
policy was serious about ensuring "that everybody get's trained so that we can avoid a 
RIF." When.asked about the possibility oflosing her employment at the School, Bautista 
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echoed the General's policy, "I'm not worried about losing my job. Then [ ifl lost my 
position as a travel clerk] I could do other things like helping the lady across the hall." 
M. CURRENTSTATUS 
Rudman must deal with a number of remaining issues because the testing and 
implementation of the new travel management system is far from complete. Some of the 
software issues still requiring resolution include: 
• the development of an interface between the test departments' Travel 
Manager Plus software and the Accounting Director's accounting database 
• modifying the budget module so departments are not allowed to exceed their 
travel budgets 
• modifying the interface between the test departments and SATO to allow 
SATO to send travelers their itinerary over the campus network instead of 
the current process of faxing travel clerks the itinerary. 
In addition, not all instructors are connected to the campuses Banyan Vines network. 
Because Travel Manager Plus relies on the campus's Banyan Vines network to transmit 
travel requests, itineraries, authorizations, accounting data, and vouchers, connection to 
this network is important if every instructor is ultimately to use the system from their 
offices. 
Friedman had hoped that eventfully PSD would not be a part of the travel 
management process. Even ifPSDs are phased out of existence, a new travel management 
system would have to rely on third-party payments and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) 
mechanisms before Friedman's aspirations could become reality. Rudman, however, 
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points out that the "DoD has been sitting on its hands with EFT." Therefore, Rudman is 
waiting for the additional guidance from the DoD and the DoN that would allow her to 
incorporate EFT into the new process. 
When the Accounting Department completes its new accounting database system, 
Rudman or her replacement will need to determine if GELCO should develop an interface 
between the Accounting Director's accounting system and Travel Manager Plus. Of 
course by the time that this decision is made, the DoD or DoN might determine that a 
completely different process and software is to be used in managing travel. 
Finally, there remains perhaps the biggest challenge: people. Not only does 
Rudman have to worry about the instructors, she must now worry about others in the 
organization attempting to shape the process to fit their expectations and desires. For 
example, during one ofRudman's weekly meetings with the test departments' travel 
clerks, the Information Systems travel clerk mentioned that she was annoyed by the fact 
that the instructors were being told that they could call hotels and book their own 
reservations. She went on to say that Dr. Whitaker had told the instructors that this was 
allowable. Rudman responded that, due to the existing contract with SATO, Whitaker 
was wrong. She added, "Dr. Whitaker does not have the last say in travel." Frustrated, 
a travel clerk at the table then muttered, "Somebody should tell Whitaker to go .... " 
Some senior JWTC administrators and instructors, however, have asserted that 
under the old system they had always been allowed to book their travel reservations. 
Rudman may have been correct, but Whitaker was also familiar with the travel 
management process and was simply restating what instructors considered to be a 
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longstanding policy at the School. Despite the 14 months that had elapsed since the 
reengineering team had finished designing the new process, personnel involved with the 
project were still unable to reach a common understanding about the specific details ofthe 
new process. 
The Accounting Department is still not fully committed to the idea of using a new 
travel management process. In May, Accounting Director Jensen, admitted, "I'm very 
pessimistic about the whole thing [getting the new process implemented]." Although 
Friedman declared Kendall a "convert," Kendall's own staff still does not fully support the 
new process. According to Brad Copper, an Information Systems travel clerk, 
"Accounting Department people don't know what you are talking about when you 
mention travel manager." Copper also said that the Accounting Department continues to 
ask for paper copies of travel documentation. Recently Bautista complained: 
Even though we are allowed to use multiple lines of accounting when we 
do travel management manually, and Travel Manager supports it [the use 
of multiple accounts for a single trip], they [the Accounting Director's 
office] will not let us do it. 
Regardless of what system finally gets implemented, whoever implements the final 
system will have to be able manage the organizational change process and the remaining 
technical implementation issues. Although technical issues are relevant and can prove to 
be substantial, the relative success of any process innovation project relies on people for 
its effect. As Davenport (1993, p. 167) points out, "Organizational, not technical, barriers 
present the major challenges in process innovation efforts." 
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IV. LESSONS LEARNED 
A. A CONSISTENT PROCESS VISION WAS NOT CREATED, 
ARTICULATED, AND SHARED WITH THE REST OF THE 
ORGANIZATION 
1. Different Visions 
Throughout the project several different process visions emerged. Both Elliot and 
Whitaker believed that the project needed to convincingly demonstrate that the School 
was capable ofreengineering its processes. Therefore, one aspect ofthe desired end-state 
for Elliot and Whitaker consisted of a successful demonstration showing that the school 
could reinvent its own processes. Elliot believed that the project's success was a crucial 
first step in implementing other process reengineering projects at the School, and 
Whitaker said the project needed to show other organizations" ... that we are ready to 
kick some butt around here." 
As part of a successful process reengineering demonstration, Whitaker and Elliot 
also wanted the project to result in a more efficient process. Friedman, Turner, and Terry 
held a similar view, and Friedman believed that cost reductions were the primary means of 
measuring the efficiency ofthe new process. The ESC seemed to agree with Friedman 
when it, according to Friedman, allowed the team to proceed because of potential cost 
savings. 
Friedman's process vision, however, included more than just eliminating 
unnecessary paperwork. Friedman wanted the new process to eliminate jobs. As a result, 
following his January 1996 trip to Washington D.C., Friedman included in his trip report a 
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recommendation that the School's leadership begin researching ways to deal with 
displaced travel clerks. 
Making travel management easier for the traveler was another process vision that 
emerged. Terry wanted to create a new system that allowed instructors to easily manage 
their own travel from their personal computers. According to Terry, the travel project 
excited him because it would result in a process that was "not just a little easier on you 
[the traveler], but dramatically better .... " The travel reengineering test plan, which was 
signed by Colonel Kendall in November 1995, also indicated that the project should satisfy 
the needs of the traveler. The test plan said that one goal of the project was to achieve 
100 percent customer satisfaction. 
When the travel reengineering project began, Colonel Kendall and Bill Jensen did 
not want to completely redesign the travel management process. Their desired end state 
consisted of maintaining the existing travel management process. They simply wanted to 
automate portions of the existing process. 
2. The Importance of Articulating a Common Process Vision 
Although each process vision had its merits, the failure to formulate and then 
spread throughout the organization a consistent purpose for the project adversely affected 
design and implementation efforts. A process vision affects the behavior of those involved 
in a change project (Kanter et al., 1992). Therefore, it is important to have a common, 
relatively stable process vision before a particular process innovation project begins 
(Kanter et al., 1992; Davenport, 1993). 
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The lack of a common process vision helps explain both the reaction of the 
Accounting Department to the proposed changes and the effect of Friedman's post-trip 
report. Bill Jensen wanted to automate portions ofthe existing process; therefore, he 
resisted the idea of relinquishing his authority over travel funds to the academic 
departments. Friedman continued with his attempts to implement the new process despite 
the fact that the Accounting Director believed that the control of travel funds should 
remain in his department. According to the test department travel clerks, a year after 
Friedman briefed Jensen, the Accounting Director's office was still not ready to support 
the new process. 
When Friedman wrote his January post-trip report, he demonstrated his conviction 
that the new travel management process should eliminate jobs. Because Friedman had not 
received prior guidance addressing the issue of employment security, he believed that his 
remarks were justifiable given his process vision, which included eliminating travel clerks. 
When Friedman was admonished for his report, he became agitated and further convinced 
that the School was not committed to process innovation. General Engle, however, was 
committed to change, but he envisioned a future state that was differed from Friedman's 
process vision. While Friedman was primarily concerned with eliminating unnecessary 
labor, the General wanted job retraining to be a part of the change process. If Friedman 
had been aware of the General's plans, he would have likely worded his report differently. 
Although the details of implementation can be worked out later in the project's life 
cycle, change strategist and implementers need to spread the description of the desired 
future state to the rest of the organization (Kanter et. al., 1992) Sharing the process 
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vision with the rest of the organization helps to ensure that change recipients understand 
why the change is taking place. If those affected by the change do not understand the 
goals of a change project, they are more likely to reach their own conclusions, confuse the 
pain of the change process with the desired end state, and not support the change process 
(Kanter et al., 1992). 
Because the project did not have an agreed upon vision, it was impossible for the 
project's founders and the travel team to share a common vision with the rest of the 
organization prior to implementation efforts. If, for example, an instructor asked one of 
the project's founders what they wanted to accomplish, they would have heard a number 
of different answers: 
• prove that JWTC is capable of reinventing itself 
• save money. 
• eliminate unnecessary job positions 
• remove unnecessary steps from the existing process 
• make the travel management process better for the traveler 
Although Friedman, Terry, and Lopez may have briefed instructors during their 
training sessions on one or all of these issues, not all of the test department instructors 
attended the training sessions. Because neither the project founders or implementers 
presented the instructors with a consistent reason for the new process, at least some 
instructors have reached their own conclusions. One instructor even suggested that new 
process was intended to make the work of the office staff easier. If this instructor truly 
believed that the new process was designed to improve the working conditions of office 
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staff, then as Kanter et al. suggest, he would have little reason to endure the pain of 
adapting to the new process. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE STEERING COMMITTEE 
1. The ESC's Role in Shaping the Process Vision 
Tate and Terry wrote in their thesis that the School's ESC failed to provide a 
vision for the project. The project's founders were all committed to the success of the 
project, but they were unable to articulate a common process vision that had the backing 
of the School's most senior leadership. Friedman could have attempted to persuade 
others that his process vision was the desired end state, but as the circumstances 
surrounding his post-trip report indicate, Friedman's authority to shape the future would 
have been disputed. 
According to Bushe and Shani, (1991, p. 126) it is particularly important in 
bureaucracies to have a process vision that is endorsed by an organization's leadership: 
We can not overemphasize the importance of having a high level of 
commitment by the steering committee to the purpose for which the 
parallel learning [project team] structure is formed, if not the parallel 
learning structure itself 
If the ESC had disseminated and supported a consistent travel-reengineering process 
vision, they could have mitigated some of the difficulties experienced during the design 
and implementation stages ofthe project. In addition to ensuring that individuals affected 
by the change understood the desired goal of the project, a frequent reiteration of the 
desired end state by the ESC would have shown the travel team and the rest of the school 
that the ESC was committed to seeing the project result in a particular set of outcomes. 
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Because the Commanding Officer lead the ESC, the Accounting Director, travel team 
participants, and instructors would have viewed a process vision coming from the ESC as 
a statement of the General's desired end state. The project founders' individual process 
visions lacked such senior-level endorsement. 
2. The Role of the ESC in Committing Sufficient Personnel Resources 
Friedman frequently complained that he had not been given adequate personnel 
resources. He did not feel that the few hours a week that team members devoted to the 
project would allow the team to be productive. Friedman's views are valid and supported 
by Hammer and Champy's (1993) assertion that the minimum acceptable commitment 
from team members is 7 5 percent of their time. 
However, a mandate from the ESC that team members dedicate more of their 
work week to the project would have given Friedman more than additional man-hours. 
Interviews with project team members and the team's minutes indicate that some team 
members were not personally committed to the project. For example, team members 
frequently failed to attend the team meetings and Friedman had to repeatedly ask team 
members for the same information. If the team members had spent a greater portion of 
their work week as team members and less time as workers within their functional 
departments, Friedman would have been more likely to have obtained the individual level 
of commitment that he felt was lacking. 
In addition to some of the project's founders, team membership consisted of 
representatives from the Accounting Department and PSD and a travel clerk. These other 
individuals were functional experts in a particular area related to travel and spent an 
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average of95 percent of their work week engaged in non-team related, functional work 
tasks. As a result, they viewed themselves as belonging to their functional departments, 
and this is one reason why Friedman did not get the individual team-member commitment 
that he had desired. 
Bushe and Shani (1991, p. 131) explain why team members need to feel like they 
are members of the team instead of representatives from other parts of the organization: 
While parallel group membership should be representative of the whole 
organization, it is important that members not be "official" representatives 
of any group. Being an official representative creates psychological 
pressure to represent the group's interests, which reduces individual 
initiative and makes it more difficult to take the organization's interests as a 
whole into account. 
When Flood said to Friedman, "I understand where you are coming from, but I'm also 
taking direction from above," she showed how difficult it was to commit to the project 
and let go of her affiliation with the Accounting Department. Although Bridge's change 
model predicts that losing an old attachment will always be difficult, the team member's 
two-hours-per-week time commitment made the change process for some team members 
even more difficult. 
C. RESISTANCE WITHIN THE TRAVEL REENGINEERING TEAM 
1. Dealing with the Loss 
In addition to old group affiliation, there are other factors that contributed to the 
team members' level of commitment and signs of resistance. Travel team members were 
more than change implementers; some were also change recipients. As change recipients, 
team members who were not the project's founders were involved in a project that would 
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change the way that they worked. Participation on the team involved letting go of old 
attitudes and beliefs, which is the first stage in Bridges three-step change model. For the 
team members from the Accounting Department, participation meant giving up the idea 
that only the Accounting Director's office should authorize the expenditure of travel 
funds. For the travel clerk team member, participation meant relinquishing the belief that 
it was the responsibility of a travel clerk to process travel requests. For the 
representatives from PSD, participation meant conceding that their office did not need to 
· be involved in the process of paying travelers. 
When people have to give up old behaviors and beliefs, they experience feelings of 
loss (Bridges, 1990). For example, Flood's participation on the travel reengineering team 
caused her a loss of turf, which Bridges describes as a loss of responsibility that is based 
on an individuals expertise. Flood's job in the Accounting Department included ensuring 
that the School's financial control mechanisms were used as part of the old travel 
management process. The new process, which she was expected to help design, proposed 
eliminating those controls and subsequently her need to apply her expertise in the new 
travel management process. As part of the new travel management process, academic 
departments, not Flood or her office, would be responsible for ensuring that travel dollars 
were obligated within legal and budgetary guidelines. 
A common reaction to loss is a natural, self-protective attempt to maintain the old 
beliefs and attitudes that are being threatened (Bridges, 1990; Tannenbaum and Hanna, 
1985). Prior to finalizing the ideal travel process flowchart, the project team entered into 
what Major Friedman described as an "extensive discussion on the controls that are 
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required or desired at JWTC." During this discussion, Flood indicated that she wanted to 
hold on to those controls which were the responsibility ofher office: 
They were talking about bypassing, in a sense, the Accounting Director's 
office, and I had to express my concerns about the fact that a lot of times 
we have departments out there that want to go ahead and spend travel 
money when they've never had the allocation for travel. So these were the 
tings that [the Accounting Director's office] were pretty concerned about, 
and the fact that right now as it is, having the travel orders come through 
our office, we really had to watch the departments to make sure that they 
did not overspend. 
Flood reacted naturally to the proposed changes; she attempted to hold on to those 
activities that were facets ofher job description. 
2. Understanding the Old Process 
Although additional information and persuasion do not eliminate the feelings of 
loss resulting from change (Bridges, 1990), dissatisfaction with the current process is a 
prerequisite to effective participation in process innovation teams (Davenport, 1993). 
Beer (1988) agrees that dissatisfaction with the current process is necessary for change: 
"Before change can take place key organizational members who are to adopt new 
attitudes and behavior must be dissatisfied with the status quo." Therefore, the analysis of 
the current process was particularly important to the team's success. 
Although Elliot, Terry, Turner and Friedman were familiar with the problems 
within the old travel management process, other team members entered the project with an 
understanding of their functional areas, not an understanding of the current process in its 
totality. Consequently, the decision to dedicate two or three meetings to understanding 
the old process resulted in more than an inability to request waivers for required 
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procedures; it deprived Friedman of a potentially valuable way to motivate team members. 
D. THE INSTRUCTORS 
1. The Desire to Keep Travel Clerks 
Instructors were also change recipients, but the project's impact on them is less 
clear. Some seemed willing to use the new process, but were dissatisfied with the 
software's user interface. Following our last interview with an instructor, Lopez had 
completed an users manual, which may make the new process more palatable for 
instructors. 
The additional work created by the process partially explains the resistance 
expressed by some instructors. To fully embrace the new process, instructors and 
department directors would have to assume additional administrative responsibilities at the 
expense of what Alverez viewed to be their primary responsibility, which was to provide 
students with an education. The natural response of instructors then was to try to hold on 
to the old way of doing business. Alverez said he would be willing to use research funds 
to pay office staff to manage his travel. A similar desire to hold on to the old process has 
stalled implementation efforts within the Communications Systems department. 
According to Bautista, the Communications Systems Department Director said to her, 
"You do it, don't give them [the instructors] the headache." 
However, to describe the instructors reactions as emanating solely from a self-
protective, albeit natural, attempt to maintain the status quo, ignores Travel Manager 
Plus's role in affecting the attitudes of instructors. For some instructors the software was 
difficult to use. The user interface was not intuitive; the program was slow; and the 
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software did not guide the user through the process of inputting the required data. The 
test department travel clerks, however, were more familiar with the software. Not only 
had some of them used the older financial version, which Terry described as being very 
similar to Travel Manager Plus, they also met weekly with the project coordinator to 
discuss how to properly use the software. Therefore, it is understandable why the 
intended end users wanted to retain the departmental travel clerks. Although Friedman 
wanted the new travel management process to eliminate jobs, the software that he and 
other project founders had selected had an opposite effect. It served to legitimize the 
travel clerks' position within the organization. 
2. The Need to Involve Instructors in the Project 
According to Whitaker and Elliot, instructors wanted a new travel management 
process. Unfortunately, as the instructors' reactions demonstrate, the end users wanted 
something different than what was implemented within the test departments. Alverez's 
remarks support the notion that instructors disliked what they were given, not the concept 
of change: "The concept is good, but the execution sucks!" 
Hammer and Champy state (1993, p. 130), "The best place for the reengineering 
team to begin to understand a process is on the customer end." Although not all process 
visions may have considered instructors to be the actual customer of the new process, 
several project founders wanted the new process to make travel management easier for the 
traveler. It is unfortunate then that the instructors did not play a larger role in shaping the 
final process. Even after the new travel management process was implemented within the 
test departments, the instructors' complaints were relegated to being signs of inflexibility 
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and egotism. 
In addition to understanding what the instructors wanted, greater participation by 
the instructors would have increased their inclination to accept the new process (Bridges, 
1990 and Kanter et. al., 1992). Because the travel reengineering project addressed issues 
other than customer satisfaction, it was important that the instructors understood the 
problems that the new process was supposed to rectify. Instructor representation on the 
travel reengineering team would have facilitated this understanding. According to Bridges 
(1991, p. 80)," Selling the problem implicates everyone in the solution. It says, 'If you 
want to be part of the solution, get involved. If you don't, don't complain."' 
E. FRIEDMAN, TERRY, AND TURNER 
1. Dedicated Military Members or Simply Outsiders? 
Friedman, Terry, and Turner were responsible for much of the progress of the 
project team, and Friedman believed that the enthusiasm shown by the three military team 
members showed that the "military is in more favor of this [the project] than the civilians." 
A closer analysis of the facts surrounding the case, however, reveals that membership in 
the military had little to do with a particular person's commitment to the project. 
Friedman even admits that "Elliot [a civilian] was good about volunteering his time too." 
Colonel Kendall, on the other hand, initially resisted the scope and magnitude of the 
project. 
Because the changes that they wanted did not force them to give up any important 
beliefs or behaviors, Friedman, Terry, and Turner could easily embrace the travel 
management project. The success of the AFDW project and their research into the waste 
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of the existing travel management process motivated Terry and Turner to attempt to build 
a better process. Friedman was motivated to change the existing process because his job 
as reinvention coordinator mandated that he reinvent something. His selection of travel 
management was based on two factors: an attempt to meet the requirements of his job by 
reinventing something that the General knew was flawed and others' previous research 
that showed that a better process could be developed. Friedman, Terry, and Turner were 
each eager to change a process that did not belong them. 
Friedman, Terry, and Turner were outsiders. Hammer and Champy (1993, pp. 
110-111) describe outsiders as individuals who "don't work in the process that's 
undergoing reengineering .... "and are "beholden to no one affected by the change .... " 
The advantage of using outsiders on a project team is that they help insiders, who are 
individuals who do have a vested interest in one part of the overall process, view the 
process from a new and exciting perspective (Hammer and Champy, 1993). 
Outsiders and insiders needed to work togther on the travel team. The insiders, 
who in this project were the travel clerks, Accounting Department staff, and 
representatives from PSD, are valuable because they impart their functional knowledge of 
the existing process to the rest of the team. Although insiders are important members of 
the project team, Hammer and Champy (1993, p. 110) warn, 
Insiders by themselves, however, are incapable of reengineering a process. 
Their individual perspectives may be too narrow, confined to just one part 
of the process. Further, insiders can hold a vested in the existing process 
and the organization designed to support it. It would be asking too much 
to expect them, unaided, to overcome their cognitive and institutional 
biases and to envision radically new ways of working. 
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2. Implications 
Nevertheless, the activities of the travel reengineering team show what can happen 
when outsiders dominate the change process. Not needing to go through a 
psychologically painful process ofletting go of old beliefs and habits and eager to import 
AFDW' s success, the outsiders wanted to hurry through the innovation process. They did 
not give other team members the opportunity to become dissatisfied with the old process; 
they did not consider alternatives to Travel Manager Plus; and ultimately Friedman 
became frustrated and convinced that others were not committed to changing the travel 
management process. 
To blame Friedman, Terry, and Turner for problems that the project encountered 
would be just as pointless as blaming other team members or the instructors. The 
behavior exhibited by these outsiders was also natural and logical. They did not need to 
go through a lengthy change process similar to what is described in the three-step change 
models. Consequently, as change recipients were struggling to let go of old ways of doing 
business, Friedman was struggling to understand why others were resisting the changes 
that he, Terry, and Turner viewed as necessary. 
F. CONCLUSION 
It is impossible to say that one course of action would have improved the travel 
reinvention process at JWTC. There were a number of factors that contributed to the 
project's characteristics, and changing one factor alone may or may not have had a 
decisively positive impact. 
110 
Nonetheless, a common theme emerges from an analysis of the JWTC project: it is 
difficult at best for a group of outsiders who do not have the backing of senior 
management to attempt to import another organization's successes. The results of such a 
scenario include the following: 
• confusion surrounding the innovation project's desired end-state 
• a tendency of some team members to identify with their functional departments 
instead of what can be considered the outsiders' change project 
• difficulty in appreciating the project's impact on the change recipients and the 
importance of the user interface 
• a willingness by the outsiders to ignore potentially valuable change tools such as 
generating dissatisfaction with the old process and listening to the end user. 
Innovation project participants who have no stake in the existing process can be invaluable 
in helping an organization change a particular process, but their existence alone does not 




APPENDIX A. TRAVEL TEAM'S IDEAL PROCESS 
The following is a description ofthe proposed travel processes outlined in the flowchart: 
+ Trip Statistics Input. Upon identifying a need to travel, the traveler will enter 
information about the trip into the software program. The information will 
include destination, itinerary, estimated expenses, etc. 
+ Commercial Ticket Office (CTO) Books Reservation and provides should-cost 
estimate. The initial trip information is electronically sent to the CTO. The 
CTO makes the reservations and provides the estimated costs of the airline, 
lodging and rental car. The software then generates a should-cost estimate 
based on the traveler and CTO input. The record is then sent electronically to 
the AA. 
+ Trip Approval. The AA will receive the trip record with a should-cost estimate. 
They will then review the balance of the identified travel fund code to determine 
if the money is available. If the money is available and the AA feels the trip is 
justified, then the record is approved. The accounting database is updated and 
the record is sent to the CTO to confirm reservations and purchase tickets. If 
the AA feels the trip is not justified or there is no money, the record will be 
returned to the traveler. The traveler must decide if the trip is essential to the 
mission and address the issue with the AA. 
+ Database updated for travel request. After the AA approves the trip, the 
database is automatically updated. This is accomplished by obligating the 
should-cost estimate of the trip against the fund code cited (plus any "safety 
factor"). 
+ CTO confirms reservations and purchases tickets. The CTO receives the 
approved request and confirms all reservations and purchases the airline tickets 
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• Traveler Picks up Tickets. The traveler will be notified electronically that their 
request has been approved. The traveler can print a copy of the trip record if 
desired. 
• Was the trip taken? If the trip was taken, the traveler will input the data from 
the trip. However, if the trip was not taken, the traveler will cancel the trip 
record and return the airline tickets for credit. 
• Database Update for canceled trip. Upon canceling the trip, the database will 
automatically be updated to deobligate funds. This includes the money spent on 
the airline tickets. 
• Data from trip. Upon returning from the trip, the traveler will input all expenses 
incurred. The program will then calculate the actual cost of the trip. If the 
actual cost is within the comptroller specified tolerance, the record 
automatically goes for payment and the database is updated with the fund cite 
expenditure. However, if the amount is outside the prescribed tolerance, the 
trip record goes to the AA. 
• Approving Authority for payment. The AA reviews the reported expenses and 
can either approve or deny the excess costs. If the AA approves the excess 
costs the record is sent for payment and the database is updated. If the AA 
does not approve the extra expense, the trip record is returned to the traveler. 
• Traveler Review after the AA. If the traveler agrees with modifications made by 
the AA, the record is approved, sent for payment, and the database updated. 
However, if the traveler and the AA cannot agree, the record will go to the 
comptroller's office for resolution. 
• Resolution. The comptroller's office will review the record and make a 
determination based on the travel rules and regulations. After resolution, the 
record is sent for payment and the database is updated. 
• Database Update for payment. Once the record is sent for payment the 
database will be updated to reflect that funds were expended. This process 
should eliminate unmatched vouchers. 
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• Payment. The voucher payment will be done electronically by GELCO 
government services. The EFT will be made directly into the traveler's bank 
account. The traveler will also have the option of sending part of his payment 
directly to the charge card company. 
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APPENDIX B. OLD TRAVEL FORMS 
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Please note ~t travel requesiS.shoufd be submitted at least t5 days prior to c1cpanure aate; 20 days prior if you want an advance. P!eau subnut department or dcree: lunded travel with at least 3 weeks lead lime for flag approval. Name:----------------------- Ext: ______ Oate: _______ _ Catesol7ravet: ______________________________________________________________________________ __ 
Destination: ________________________________________________________________ __ 
iype of Orders: Single Group lnvitacionaf (lTC) Fund Cite No ~St 
!!! Pl~SE 00 NOT MAKE RESEMVATIONS W!Ti-4 INOMOUAL.liRUNES!!! 
Pt.EASC MAKE RES&t-vATION 
Aitfine 
r:lenraf C..r ----
FlU. OUT ATT.ACHEO a8. FORM 




·. ••Recues: authori:ation for use ol iAXI/UMO/POV in ;nd arounc: rev lr!a. No autnori:ation neec:td lor ::ans::or:atlen to/from 
.air;,or.. 
fUNDING; C::s: ~oej.Joo Crc:er No. ------------
MEG:SiriATION FEE riECUIREO'? Yes/No s ____________ (R.ele~ to memo 9 Oe: SS} 
Cate :ee recuired by--------------------
•. Ooes registration fee ine1uoe any 
a) meals Yes/No :,) :OOc;ing Yes/No 
If yes. 
a. Oates ________________________ _ 
Meats ________________________ _ 
(e.g .• :ireaktast, iune.-:. :Jr arnner; 
b. lodging: f'tejcay ____________ Oist eae.'l cay) 
AOVANC~ MEOUIRED7 YES/NO (!SSUEC 2 days prior 10 oep:&rn~rt date) 
CONFERENCE ATiENOEES: 
t. ARE YOU PRESENTING ;.. ?AP!::R7 YES/NO 
z. ARE YOU .J. ?ANEL!Si'? ':"ES/NO 
E;(Pt..;..NATION: 
:.Jtiii::Hioo of 9overnmem ~uilners reQuirec. il ava•iacle. wnen ;ra.,eiin9 := ar.:::."'er ;ev~rnment post/ins:attatian. otnerw•se orc:ers mus: ::e stamoec to inoie:ll! nonavaiiao•iity . .:.nv soeoa• cr unusuai ..-:-Vl~~:-:-:!n:s ~O<..,d bNEolt0t :: :.":e ac:eooon ::t ::-:e :ra·'~' :::eo< 3EF'J~E :r:~ve 1 oraers :lre :::roc:ess~. POC AT DESTINATION e: PH • 
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TRAVEL REQUEST FORM 
NAME: SSN: 
DEPARTMENT: CODE: 
DATES OF TRAVEL: DATES OF LEAVE: 
ITINERARY: _______________________ _ 
PURPOSE: 
* IF NO COST TO GOVERNMEI\"T: 
(A) WHO IS FUNDING TRAVEL? 
PERSONAL FUNDS: 
PRIVATE COMPANY/UNIVERSITY(Name): 
(B) HOW IS SAlARY BEING PAID WHILE ON NO-::C:-:::O:-:::S:T-::0::-:R::-:D::-:E:::R::-::S:-::-?----------
O&MN: AL: LWOP: OTHER (Explain) 
IF O&MN, JUSTIFICATION(Value to U.S. Governm_e_n-:t)-: ------------
(C) WILL AN HONORARIUM BE RECEIVED? YES NO 
(D) NO. OF DAYS OF NO COST TAD \VHILE IN A PAY STATU~ 
SIGNATURES: 
TRAVELER (Datt') 
CODE 08 (if Research $3,000 or more) (Date) 
LINE M.4:\AGER (Date) 
ESTIMATED COSTS: 
TRANSPORTATION 
Comm'l. Air (GTR) PER DIEM** 
$ ____ _ $ ____ _ 
** Breakdown of Per Diem Costs: 
Lodging & Meals: $ ____ _ 
Rental Car: $ 
-----POV: $ ____ _ 
Taxi: $ 
-----Ra i 1 : $ 
-----
--
DEPT. HEAD / CURRJC. OFFCR (Date) 
P.J. (If Research Funds) (Datej 
REGISTRATION/ 
TUITION FEES TOTAL 
$ s 
-----
Other (Specify): ___________ _ $ ____ _ 
SUPERINTENDENT APPROVAL (Required when (1) total estimated costs equal or exceed $3,000; (2) total 
days of delay and leave equals or exceeds the total days of TAD; or (3) when civilian no cost orders exceed five (5) 
calendar days while in a pay status.) 
Date: ___ _ 
SUPERINTENDENT 
119 (SEE REVERSE) 
IT IS THE RESPONSIBILnY OF THE DEPT. CHAIR\US
 TO ENSURE TII.~T lABOR AND TRAVEL Ft.JNDING ARE 
PAID FROM THE APPROPRl.<\TE SOURCES. 
NOTE: WHEN OJ' OFFICIAL TRAVEL,lABORFUJ\"DING
 WILL NORMALLY COMEFROMTHESA.\1EACCOCJ\T
 
ASTRA VEL FU!\'DING. EXCEPTION IS IFTiiE TRIP IS T
O SUPPORT MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OFTiiE SCHOOL. 
IN THAT CASE, IF THE TIME SPE:'-T ON 0!\"E OF TiiES
E FUNCTION$ EXCEEDS 50% OF THE TRIP. THERE IS 
NO NEED FOR SPLIT ACCOU:'-TING FOR TRAVEL; I.E.
, THE PREPONDERM'T FUNCTION CA.'\ FULLY FU!\D 
THE TRAVEL. HO\\'EVER., LABOR MCST BE PRORAT
ED FOR AcnJAL TIME SPEJ\T ON EACH FUNCTIO:--:. 
FU!\'DING ACCOU!\T FOR lABOR 
Job Order 
DT -----DR ____ _ 
IR -----
RR -----






(DT = Direct Teaching; DR = Direct Research; IR - Indirect Re
search; RR 
- Reimbursable Research) 
*IF ALL OR A.l\'Y PORTION OF THE TRI\VEL IS BEIN
G FUNDED, OR PROVIDED IN KIND, BY OTHER 
THA.N U.S. GO\'ERN'JVIEI\1 SOURCES, AND IF THE DO
LLAR VALUE EXCEEDS $250, COl\lPLETE FORM 
"GIFTS OF TRA\'EL FROM NO:!'<-FEDER.\1. SOURCES"
 AND ATIACH TO ORDERS. 
**IF TRI\\'EL COMMENCES ON A FRIDAY OR WEEKEN
D DAY, AND/OR RETUR.l'l< IS ON MONDAY OR 










JUSTIFICATION IF SPLIT ACCOUNTING IS REQUIRED (If split accounting is
 used, 








PLEASE FAX TO (408) 655-4485 
REQUEST FOR TRAVEL 
Name of Traveler (last, First> RANK/RATE Activity attached to Activity to be visited 
RESERVATIONS BY: OFFICE PHONE: 
SSN OF TRAVELER: YOUR FAX NUMBER: 
EXACT LOCATION: HOME TELEPHONE: 
HOTEL RESERVATION ONLY: BOQ REQUEST ONLY: 
CC#: EXP DATE: NAME OF BASE TO BE VISITED: 
RATE .AUTHORIZED: POC WHERE VISITING: 
OFFICIAL PASSPORT NUMBER: POC PHONE NUMBER: 
ISSUE DATE: EXP DATE: 
RESERVATIONS REQUIRED 
Departure Date Approximate Departure Time **Must Arrive By From To 
Return Date 
**Latest time traveler can arrive at destination for TOY. This space may be left blank if e~act arrival tim e is not important. 
Seat Preference: __ smoking 
__ Non-Smoking __ Window __ Aisle 
Traveler Authorized Rental Car: __ Yes __ No Size of Car Authorized 
Navy contract requires use of GSA Contract carriers in accordance with the Federal Travel Directory, Under t 
contract the government has guaranteed the airline named in the contract all Federal .T.ravel between your ori You are advised that having the ticket reissued on another carrier for personal preference or convenience is it is necessary to change airlines as a result of flight cancellations or changes to travel requirements, a 
reason should be included on the travel voucher. 
Companies with which MTMC has negotiated special DOD/Government car rental rates will be used to the exclusi Navy contract requires use of the lowest available rate. 
Note: Travelers are not required to select airline or flight number. Travel clerks are required to arrange 
available. 
he terms of the 
gin and destination 
prohibited. If 
statement as to the 
on of all others. 
least costly travel 
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT: The authority to request this information is contained in 5 USC 552 Department Regu lations. This information will be used to assist officer and employees of the Department of the Navy in arranging passeng Completion of the form is manatory except for SSN (SSN is mandatory for overseas travel and BOO reservation to provide required information may result in delay in response or disapproval of your request. 
~ Signature ll Date 
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er transportation. 
) . Failure to 
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APPENDIX C. TRAVEL MANAGER SCREEN DISPLAYS 
":''T'' [Javel Manager Plus 
· ~~~ .. 
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~=Travel Manager Plus . . . 1!!!11!1 
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~· 1 ravel Manager Plus · l!!ilil 
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